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COMMENTS
ATLANTIS REVISITED: RECOVERY UNDER MARYLAND
LAW FOR PURELY ECONOMIC LOSS AGAINST
NEGLIGENT BUILDERS AND MANUFACTURERS
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, building contractors and product manufacturers
were not liable in tort for either personal injury or property damage
to parties with whom they had no privity. 1 Building contractors owed
duties only to· those parties with whom they had a contract,2 and
not to the homeowner or third parties. Likewise, manufacturers owed
duties only by virtue of their contract with the immediate purchaser
of their product-either the distributor or the retailer-but not to
the product's ultimate user. 3
In the landmark decision of MacPherson v. Buick Motor CO.,4
the New York Court of Appeals abolished the requirement of privity
in negligence actions against manufacturers of defective products. 5
Judge Cardozo, writing for the court, held that a manufacturer may
be liable in tort "irrespective of contract" for personal injuries
I.

1. For most of the 19th century, courts in both the United States and England
denied negligence claims in the absence of privity of contract. In the seminal
case of Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842), the English Court
of Exchequer held that an injured passenger of a mail coach did not have a
cause of action against the party under contract with the owner to keep the
coach in repair. Id. at 404-06. According to the court, allowing a party not in
privity to maintain an action would lead to "the most absurd and outrageous
consequences, to which I can see no limit." Id. at 405. See also Ford v.
Sturgis, 14 F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir. 1926) (denying recovery in tort to estate of
theater patron killed by collapse of theater); Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing
Mach. Co., 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903) (denying recovery in tort to an employee
who suffered physical injury from defendant manufacturer's threshing machine).
2. Typically, these parties are the developer or other subcontractors, including
architects, surveyors and engineers. Annotation, Negligence oj Building or
Construction Contractor as Ground oj Liability upon His Part jor Injury or
Damage 10 Third Person Occurring After Completion and Acceptance of the
Work, 58 A.L.R.20 865 (1958).
3. See generally Michael D. Leider, Constructing a New Action for Negligent
Infliction of Economic Loss: Building on Cardozo and Coase, 66 WASH. L.
REV. 937, 943-44 (1991).
4. III N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
5. In MacPherson, the plaintiff was injured when a defective wheel on his
automobile collapsed. Id. at 1051. He sued the manufacturer of the wheel
despite the absence of privity. Id.
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resulting from its negligence. 6 Cardozo noted that the court "put
aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb ... grows
out of contract and nothing else."7
The privity requirement has likewise been abolished in negligence
actions against building contractors where personal injury is involved. s In Inman v. Binghamton Housing AuthoritY,9 a negligence
action was brought against the architect of an apartment building
for personal injuries suffered by a child who fell from a defective
concrete porch. IO The New York Court of Appeals denied the architect's privity defense and found that there was no meaningful distinction between injuries caused by chattels, as in MacPherson, and
those involving building structures. I I
The trend towards relaxation of the privity requirement has been
slow to catch hold in cases where the resulting harm is characterized
as an "economic loss." Generally, an economic loss is the loss of
an expectancy interest created by contract, and occurs when a product
or a building proves inferior in quality or does not perform for the
purposes for which it is intended. 12 Economic losses may include
such things as the loss of value or use of the product or building,
the cost to repair or replace the product or building, or the lost
profits resulting from the loss of use.13

6. Id. at 1053, 1057.
7. Id. at 1053.
8. See generally 3 F. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.5, at 708-11 (2d
ed. 1986) (delineating the erosion of privity in construction); James M. Dente,

Negligence Liability to all Foreseeable Parties for Pure Economic Harm: The
Final Assault upon the Citadel, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 587, 587-89 (1986).
9. 143 N.E.2d 895 (N.Y. 1957).

10. Id. at 897.
11. Id. at 898-99.
12. See generally Sidney R. Barrett, Jr., Recovery of Economic Loss in Tort for
Construction Defects: A Critical Analysis, 40 S.c. L. REV. 891, 894-97 (1989)
(reviewing history of economic loss doctrine); Comment, Manufacturers' Liability to Remote Purchasers for "Economic Loss" Damages- Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 539, 541 (1966). The courts seldom adhere to a
consistent definition of what types of damages are encompassed within the
term "economic loss" and, in fact, are often simply confused by the entire
issue. See Christopher C. Fallon, Jr., Physical Injury and Economic LossThe Fine Line of Distinction Made Clearer, 27 VILL. L. REV. 483, 484-85
(1981-82). For example, in Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 342 N.E.2d 619 (Ind.
1976), the court 3tated that all injuries, whether to person or property,
ultimately result in economic loss. Id. at 621. See also Cosmopolitan Homes,
Inc. v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041, 1044 n.5 (Colo. 1983) (citing Barnes for the
proposition that "both injury to one's person and injury to one's property
result in economic loss").
13. A.J. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 333 Md. 245, 250, 634 A.2d
1330, 1332 (1994); see also Barrett, supra note 12, at 892 n.!. For instance, if
a farmer purchases a new tractor and finds that a part has to be replaced at
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Because an economic loss is predicated upon the existence of a
contract, courts have often been reluctant to allow a third person
who is not a party to the contract to recover purely economic losses.1 4
Historically, however, courts have not denied the recovery of economic losses to third parties in all circumstances. It is well-settled,
for instance, that a third party may recover against building contractors or manufacturers for economic loss as a "parasitic"
damage l5 -that is, when the economic loss is accompanied by physical
harm to person or property. 16 The long-standing debate has been
whether, absent privity of contract, a plaintiff may recover economic
losses in a negligence action where there is no accompanying physical
damage to person or property other than to the product or the
structure itself.17 The general rule adhered to by a majority of the
states in both the manufacturing and construction contexts is often
referred to as the "economic loss doctrine." Simply stated, with or
without privity of contract, the economic loss doctrine holds that
there is "no general duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid intangible economic loss or losses that do not arise from tangible physical
harm to persons and tangible things." 18

14.
15.
16.

17.

18.

a cost of $500, this would be an economic loss. If the farmer also suffered
$1000 in lost profits' to his business while the tractor was being repaired, this
too would be an economic loss.
See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
93, at 668-69 (5th ed. 1984).
Dente, supra note 8, at 589 n.20.
See KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 129, at 997. As the court stated in the
oft-cited case, People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Conrail Corp., 495 A.2d 107
(N.J. 1985):
The single characteristic that distinguishes parties in negligence suits
whose claims for economic losses have been regularly denied by
American and English courts from those who have recovered economic
losses is, with respect to the successful claimants, the fortuitous
occurrence of physical harm or property damage, however slight. It
is well-accepted that a defendant who riegligently injures a plaintiff
or his property may be liable for all proximately caused harm,
including economic losses.
ld. at 109.
Even in cases where the plaintiff has suffered physical harm and economic
loss, the courts have recognized that the defendant is not liable for each and
every consequence of his conduct, but only those that he proximately caused.
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100-01 (N.Y. 1928).
When economic loss has been sustained without any accompanying physical
damage, other than to the product itself, most courts and commentators
characterize the resultant harm as "pure economic harm." This Comment will
use this definition of the term.
KEETON ET AL, supra note 14, § 92, at 657. This rule was consistently applied
throughout the earlier part of this century. For instance, in the early case of
Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927), the Supreme
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There is little authority in Maryland regarding the rights of third
parties to recover under the economic loss doctrine. The state's courts
have adopted the rule of MacPherson,19 and generally recognize that
privity is not required for a third party to maintain a negligence
action against a manufacturer for either personal injury or property
damage. 2o The courts, however, have yet to identify fully in what
instances purely economic losses are recoverable by third parties in
tort actions against manufacturers and building contractors. A 1986
decision by the Court of Appeals of Maryland sheds light on the
current status of the economic loss doctrine in Maryland. In Council
oj Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium, Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 21 the court held that
privity is not an absolute prerequisite to the existence of a
tort duty .... [T]he duty of builders and architects ... to
u~e due care in the design, inspection, and construction of
a building extends to those persons foreseeably subjected to
the risk of personal injury because of a latent and unreasonably dangerous condition resulting from that negligence .... [W]here the dangerous condition is discovered
before it results in injury, an action in negligence will lie
for the recovery of the reasonable cost of correcting the
condition. 22
The Atlantis decision is a significant clarification of the status
of both the privity defense and the economic loss doctrine in negli-

19.
20.

21.
22.

Court denied recovery in negligence to time charterers who lost profits when
the vessel they chartered was damaged while being repaired by the defendant
dry dock company. [d. at 307. Justice Holmes found that the contract was
between the dry dock company and the owners of the vessel; accordingly, the
time charterers did not have a claim in contract or in tort for the lost profits.
[d. at 309-10. See also Byrd v. English, 43 S.E. 419 (Ga. 1903) (denying
recovery to owner of printing plant for lost profits incurred when defendant
negligently damaged electrical conduits that supplied power to the plant);
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931) (denying
recovery to lender in negligence action against borrower's accountant for
economic loss incurred as a result of reliance on a negligently prepared balance
sheet); Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946)
(denying recovery of lost wages to employee who was unable to work as a
result of negligent rupture of stored natural gas tank at defendant's nearby
utility plant).
III N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
See, e.g., Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Servs., 326 F. Supp. 709 (D. Md.
1971); Babylon v. Scruton, 215 Md. 299, 138 A.2d 375 (1958); Kaplan v. Stein,
198 Md. 414, 84 A.2d 81 (1951); Excavation Constr., Inc. v. Mack Trucks,
Inc., 576 F. Supp. 312 (D. Md. 1981).
308 Md. 18, 517 A.2d 336 (1986).
[d. at 22, 517 A.2d at 338.
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gence actions brought by third parties. The court of appeals not only
rejected the privity defense and adopted, for the first time, a standard
of foreseeability in determining the tort liability of building contractors to third parties, but it also suggested that purely economic loss
may be recovered in such actions. The plaintiffs in Atlantis incurred
neither property damage nor actual personal injury. By awarding
them the reasonable cost of correcting dangerous building conditions
where the mere risk of personal injury was present, the court effectively granted damages for purely economic loss.' As the court reasoned, "the determination of whether a duty will be imposed in this
type of case should depend upon the risk generated by the negligent
conduct, rather than the fortuitous circumstance of the nature of the
resultant damage. "23
In Maryland's products liability area, two recent appellate decisions have applied the "risk of harm" approach set forth in
Atlantis.24 Although neither decision awarded the plaintiff economic
losses, it is now evident that under Maryland law, a purchaser of a
defective product may recover under a negligence theory for purely
economic losses, including harm to the product itself, if the defect
in the product causes a dangerous condition creating a risk of death
or personal injury to the purchaser. 2s
This Comment. first discusses some of the underpinnings of the
economic loss doctrine, including policy reasons for its adoption.
Second, this Comment explores the current viability of the economic
loss doctrine in the United States and, in particular, under Maryland
law in the areas of products liability and negligent construction. 26
Finally, this Comment will close with a discussion of Atlantis and
other recent decisions, and their potential impact on the recovery of
purely economic losses in Maryland.
II.

UNDERPINNINGS OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE
One of the primary reasons advanced by the courts and various
commentators in support of the economic loss doctrine is that re. 23. [d. at 35, 517 A.2d at 345. Several other states have expressly denied recovery
in tort for the mere risk of harm. See, e.g., Crowell Corp. v. Topkis Constr.
Co., 280 A.2d 730 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); National Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel
Tube Corp., 332 N.W.2d 39 (Neb. 1983) (denying recovery in tort for expenses
undertaken to repair defective parts of a crane which was in danger of
collapsing); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 656 F. Supp. 49
(S.D. Ohio 1986).
24. A.J. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 333 Md. 245, 634 A.2d 1330
(1994); Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 99 Md. App. 646, 639 A.2d 147
(1994).
25. A.J. Decoster, 333 Md. at 251-54, 634 A.2d at 1333-34; Morris, 99 Md. App.
at 655-56, 639 A.2d at 152.
26. This Comment superficially covers the recovery of pure economic losses under
other causes of action such as strict liability, breach of warranty, and negligent
misrepresentation. See infra part II I.D.
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co very of economic losses under tort law principles would expose
contractors and manufacturers "to liability in an indeterminate amount
for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. "27 As one
commentator accurately noted, "only a limited amount of physical
damage can ever ensue from a single act, while the number of
economic interests a tortfeasor may destroy in a brief moment of
carelessness is practically limitless. "28 For example, a driver who
negligently causes a traffic accident during rush hour would certainly
be responsible for the personal injuries suffered by those involved in
the accident. It is doubtful, however, that the driver would also be
held responsible for the provable losses suffered by truck drivers
who were delayed as a result of the rush hour traffic jam or to the
employee who was forced to clock in at work an hour late. 29 In
order to place manageable limits on liability in negligence actions,
the requirement of some type of physical harm, measurable and
identifiable, has been established as a necessary element of the causal
relationship between a plaintiff's economic harm and the defendant's
negligence. 3o Most courts, therefore, have recognized that economic
loss is recoverable only when it is accompanied by physical damage,
such as parasitic damage. 3l When only economic harm is incurred,
the courts have traditionally denied recovery in tort. 32
Another reason advanced in support· of the economic loss doctrine is that economic losses are the type of damages which have
traditionally been covered by principles of contract and warranty

27. UItramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931).
Justice Cardozo continued, "[tJhe hazards of a business conducted on these
terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the
implication of duty that exposes to these consequences." !d.
28. Comment, Foreseeability of Third Party Economic Injuries-A Problem in
Analysis, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 283, 298 (1953).
.
29. In re Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821, 825 n.8 (2d Cir. 1968).
30. Kelly M. Hnatt, Comment, Purely Economic Loss: A Standard for Recovery,
73 IOWA L. REV. 1181, 1190-94 (1988).
31. Indeed, when a defendant's conduct results in some type of physical harm,
either to the plaintiff's person or property other than the product itself, the
resulting loss is not "economic." See supra part III.A -B. There is considerable
debate regarding whether damage to the product itself constitutes economic
loss, which is generally not recoverable in negligence, and under what circumstances damage to property "other than the product itself" may constitute
recoverable property damage. See supra part III.A-B.
32. See, e.g., Byrd v. English, 43 S.E. 419, 420-21 (Ga. 1903) (denying recovery
by commercial printer against contractor whose negligence caused downed
power lines and resulted in loss of power to the plaintiff's presses); Brink v.
Wabash R.R., 60 S.W. 1058, 1059-60 (Mo. 1901) (denying recovery against
defendant who negligently derailed train which resulted in death of plaintiff's
son, thereby preventing son from carrying out his contractual obligations to
support plaintiff).
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law, not tort law. Economic harm is typically incurred when a product
or building fails to meet the expectations of the buyer, or when the
only loss sustained is the cost of repair or replacement, the consequent
loss of profits, or the diminution in value. 33 When the defect in a
product or building structure is of such a qualitative nature, principles
of contract and warranty law provide the appropriate remedy. 34
Contract law protects expectancy interests and provides the appropriate set of rules when a purchaser wants a product to perform in
a certain way, or expects the product to be of a particular quality
or fit for a particular use. 35 In addition, contracts perform the
important function of allocating risks among the parties, including
the risk that profits will be lost if the product fails. Tort law, in
contrast, imposes standards of reasonable care upon all persons to
avoid causing foreseeable harm to the person or property of others. 36
Recovery of economic loss under tort principles, it is argued, would
frustrate the risk-allocating function of contracts.
Several leading cases have also applied the economic loss doctrine
to deny recovery in tort for purely economic loss on the basis that
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) adequately provides for the
recovery of such losses through express or implied warrantiesY The
Supreme Court of Idaho, for instance, found no compelling reason
to extend negligence principles "into an area in which the legislature
[had) already enacted comprehensive legislation, thereby undermining
that legislation. "38 The court reasoned that "the UCC provisions

33. See generally Barrett, supra note 12, at 894-95.
34. See generally Comment, Manufacturer's Liability to Remote Purchasers for
"Economic Loss" Damages-Tort or Contract?, 114 V. PA. L. REV. 539
(1966); see also Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652
F .2d 1165, 1172-73 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that buyer was not precluded from
seeking tort recovery because damage to front-end loader constituted physical
rather than economic injury); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435
N.E.2d 443, 451 (III. 1982) (holding that crack in grain storage tank constituted
.
economic loss for which buyer could recover in contract only).
35. Barrett, supra note 12, at 901-02.
36. [d.
37. See, e.g., 2000 Watermark Ass'n v. Celotex Corp., 784 F.2d 1183, 1186 (4th
Cir. 1986); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626
F.2d 280, 288-91 (3d Cir. 1980); Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145,
151-52 (Cal. 1965); Clark v. International Harvester Co., 581 P.2d 784, 79294 (Idaho 1978); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443,
447-48 (III. 1982) ("[I]t is preferable to relegate the consumer to the comprehensive scheme of remedies fashioned by the VCC, rather than requiring the
consuming public to pay more for their products so that a manufacturer can
insure against the possibility that some of his products will not meet the
business needs of some of his customers."); Nelson v. Todd's Ltd., 426 N.W.2d
120, 125 (Iowa 1988).
38. Clark v. International Harvester Co., 581 P.2d 784, 794 (Idaho 1978).
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adequately define the rights of the parties in such cases and that
judicial expansion of negligence law to cover purely economic losses
would only add more confusion in an area already plagued with
overlapping and conflicting theories of recovery. "39
Other courts argue that permitting recovery of economic losses
in tort would make it virtually impossible for a manufacturer to sell
a product "as is."4O The VCC is based upon the principle that parties
should be free to make contracts as they choose, including contracts
that disclaim liability for breaches of warranty.41 Conversely, those
courts that do not adhere to the economic loss rule have no difficulty
reconciling the recovery of economic loss in negligence actions with
the no-fault liability scheme of the UCC.42 These courts reason that
a manufacturer should owe a duty of care to users of its products
to prevent foreseeable harm, and that economic loss from defective
products is "within the range of reasonable manufacturer foresight. "43
III. RECOVERY OF PVREL Y ECONOMIC LOSS IN
NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS AGAINST MANUFACTURERS
In the area of manufacturing defects, an overwhelming majority
of courts in the country have held that a purchaser of a defective
39. [d.

40. See, e.g., 2000 Watermark Ass'n, Inc. v. Celotex Corp., 784 F.2d 1183 (4th
Cir. 1986), in which the Fourth Circuit stated:
The UCC is generally regarded as the exclusive source for ascertaining
when the seller is subject to liability for damages if the claim is based
on an intangible economic loss and not attributable to physical injury
to person or to a tangible thing other than the defective product
itsel f. [citation omitted) 1f intangible economic loss were actionable
under a tort theory, the UCC provisions permitting assignment of risk
by means of warranties and disclaimers would be rendered meaningless. It would be virtually impossible for a seller to sell a product "as
is" because if the product did not meet the economic expectations of
the buyer, the buyer would have an action under tort law. The UCC
represents a comprehensive statutory scheme which satisfies the needs
of the world of commerce, and courts have been reluctant to extend
judicial doctrines that might dislocate the legislative structure.
[d. at 1186 (citation omitted).
41. Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 668 (N.J.
1985). "[T)he UCC is the more appropriate vehicle for resolving commercial
disputes arising out of business transactions between persons in a distributive
chain." [d.
42. See, e.g., Western Seed Prod. Corp. v. Campbell, 442 P.2d 215 (Or. 1968);
Berg v. General Motors Corp., 555 P.2d 818 (Wash. 1976).
43. Western Seed, 442 P.2d at 218 (quoting Marc A. Franklin, When Worlds
Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18
STAN. L. REV. 974, 989 (1966».
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product may not recover purely economic losses in a negligence
action· against a manufacturer. 44 These courts generally permit recovery only for actual physical harm, either in the form of personal
injury to the plaintiff or in the form of damage to "other property,"
that is, injury to property other than the product itself. 45 When injury
is sustained by only the product itself, it is typically in the form of
deterioration, internal breakdown, or some other failure of the
product to meet the purchaser's expectations. 46 This type of damage
is characterized as economic in nature 47 and, it is argued, is more
properly governed by contract or warranty law, rather than tort law
principles. 48

A. The Requirement oj Physical Damage to Property Other Than
the Product Itself
The requirement that physical damage be incurred to property
other than the product itself has been adopted by most courts and
has proven to be a significant barrier to recovery in tort. 49 In one
44. For some of the leading cases denying recovery of purely economic losses in
negligence actions, see 2000 Watermark Ass'n v. Celotex Corp., 784 F.2d 1183
(4th Cir. 1986); Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 771 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir.
1985); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d
280 (3d Cir. 1980); Arizona v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 391 F. Supp. 962
(D. Ariz. 1975); Long v. Jim Letts Oldsmobile, Inc., 217 S.E.2d 602 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1975); Clark v. International Harvester Co., 581 P.2d 784 (Idaho 1978);
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443 (III. 1982); Alfred
N. Koplin & Co., Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 364 N.E.2d 100 (III. App. Ct. 1977)
(denying recovery in negligence action against manufacturer for cost of repairing
and replacing defective air conditioners); Clevenger & Wright Co. v. A.O.
Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 625 S.W.2d 906 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); National
Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 332 N.W.2d 39 (Neb. 1983).
45. See generally Barrett, supra note 12, at 894-97.
46. See generally Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66
COLUM. L. REV. 917,918 (1966).
47. The Supreme Court of South Carolina, in Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber &
Manufacturing Co., 384 S.E.2d 730 (S.C. 1989), stated that "[tlhe 'economic
loss rule' simply states that there is no tort liability for a product defect if the
damage suffered by the plaintiff is only to the product itself. In other words,
tort liability only lies where the damage done is to other property or is personal
injury." [d. at 734.
48. See, e.g., 2000 Watermark Ass'n v. Celotex Corp., 784 F.2d 1183 (4th Cir.
1986); R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818 (8th Cir.
1983); Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d
1165, 1169-72 (3d Cir. 1981).
49. See, e.g., R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818 (8th
Cir. 1983) (holding that diminution in value of building and lost rent incurred
as a result of negligent manufacture of glass panels were merely economic
losses and not recoverable in tort); City of Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co.,
640 F. Supp. 559, 564 (D. S.c. 1986) (holding that manufacturer could be
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of the most oft-cited cases, Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National
Tank Co., 50 a plaintiff purchased a grain storage tank from the
defendant who designed and manufactured the tanks. 51 When a crack
developed in the tank because of a defect, the plaintiff brought suit
in negligence and strict liability for the cost of repairs, and for loss
of use of the tankY The Supreme Court of Illinois denied recovery
against the manufacturer under both negligence and strict liability
theories. 53 The court reasoned that the crack in the tank was not the
type of "sudden and dangerous occurrence" that tort law was
designed to protect. 54 Instead, the law of warranty afforded the
plaintiff the proper measure of protection against commercial losses
of this nature. 55 The repair of the tank and the loss of its use were
economic losses, and the plaintiff's only remedy lied in contract. 56
The distinction between damage that has occurred to "other
property" and damage to the product itself is a difficult line to
draw, and those courts attempting to do so are seldom consistent.
In 2000 Watermark Ass'n. v. Celotex Corp. ,57 a homeowner's association sued the manufacturer of asphalt shingles in negligence when
blisters appeared on the shingles, shortening their expected life. 58 The
association argued that the removal of the defective shingles caused
actual property damage, not mere economic loss, because the under-

50.
51.
52.

53.
54.
55.
56.

57.
58.

liable in negligence for contamination of building caused by asbestos), a/I'd,
827 F.2d 975 (4th Cir. 1987); Agristor Leasing v. Guggisberg, 617 F. Supp.
902, 908 (D. Minn. 1985) (denying recovery against manufacturer of animal
feed storage system for damage to feed on basis that feed was not "other
property"); Arrow Leasing Corp. v. Cummins Ariz. Diesel, Inc., 666 P.2d
544, 547-49 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that plaintiff could not recover in
negligence and strict liability against manufacturer of turbo-charger component
of tractor for damage caused only to turbo-charger itself and engine; also
holding for first time that when component part of product damages another
component part, resulting harm may constitute damage to "other property,"
but not when damaged part was also provided by same vendor); Chrysler Corp.
v. Taylor, 234 S.E.2d 123 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977); Clark v. International Harvester
Co., 581 P.2d 784 (Idaho 1978); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co.,
435 N.E.2d 443 (III. 1982); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., v. Steeple Jac
Inc., 352 N. W .2d 107, 109 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that defective gear
box, which caused window washing unit to fall from plaintiff's building, was
not actionable in negligence since there was no damage to persons or other
property); Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 209 N.E.2d 583 (Ohio 1965).
435 N .E.2d 443 (III. 1982).
Id. at 445.
Id.
Id. at 451-52.
Id. at 450.
Id.
Id.
784 F.2d 1183 (4th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1185.
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lying tar paper had also been damaged and needed to be replaced
before new shingles could be installed. 59 Applying South Carolina
law, the Fourth Circuit found that no property damage aside from
the defective shingles had been incurred. 60 According to the court,
the expenses associated with replacement of the tar paper were only
incidental in nature and would be recoverable only in a warranty
action, not an action for negligence. 61
In contrast, in Minneapolis Society of Fine Arts v. ParkerKlein,62 the Supreme Court of Minnesota indicated that this type of
incidental damage might give rise to recovery in negligence on the
basis 'that damage was incurred by "other property. "63 The plaintiff
in Parker-Klein brought suit in negligence and strict liability against
the manufacturer of brick used in the construction of the exterior
walls of two buildings. 64 Shortly after construction, the brick proved
defective and began to crack, craze, and spall. 65 The court found
that the record did not support the plaintiff's claim that property
apart from the brick itself was physically damaged, particularly since
the brick was used for non-load-bearing walls and because the repairs
to the buildings were completed without affecting their underlying
structure. 66 The court noted, however, that the failure of the brick
had caused damage to the mortar between the bricks, and acknowledged that this might constitute damage to "other property. "67 However, the plaintiff had not provided a breakdown of the cost to
repair the mortar, and the court refused to allow the plaintiff to sue
in tort for six million dollars solely by virtue of the relatively minor
damages to the mortar. 68
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the "other
property" requirement on only one occasion. In East River Steam. ship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 69 the plaintiff was a
shipbuilder who had contracted with a turbine manufacturer to
design, manufacture, and install turbines in four vessels. 70 When the
ships were put into service, the turbines in all four vessels malfunc-

59.
60.
61.
62.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

[d. at 1187.
[d. at 1187-88.
[d.

354 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1984), overruled by Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458
N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990).
[d. at 820-21.
[d. at 817.
[d. at 818.
[d. at 820.
[d. at 820 n.4.
[d.
476 U.S. 858 (1986).
[d. at 859.
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tioned. The shipbuilder sued the manufacturer for the cost of
repairing the turbines and for lost profits, alleging that the manufacturer was strictly liable for design defects and that it negligently
supervised the installation of one of the turbines. 72
The Court reviewed the majority and minority approaches to
the issue of economic loss. The majority approach, according to the
Court, holds that damage to a product itself is a purely monetary
loss that is more properly covered by warranty law. 73 The minority
view holds that a manufacturer's duty to produce a product that is
not defective encompasses inj ury to the product itself. 74 Finding the
minority view unpersuasive, the Court unanimously held that a
manufacturer owes no duty under either a negligence or strict liability
theory to prevent a product from damaging itself. 75 In this circumstance, when no person or other property is damaged, the resulting
loss is purely economic and is best addressed by contractual remedies. 76
Only a few courts have found that economic loss, in the absence
of any damage to either persons or other property, is recoverable in
negligence actions. 77 These courts permit recovery regardless of whether
the damage is only to the product itself, and irrespective of the
manner in which the harm occurred. 78 Instead, these courts focus on
the foreseeability of the resulting harm as the principal determinant
of liability.
In Berg v. General Motors Corp. ,79 the plaintiff was a commercial fisherman who sued for lost profits incurred when the diesel
boat engine manufactured by the defendant broke down due to an
error in factory assembly. 80 The Supreme Court of Washington
rejected the defendant's privity defense and its argument that the
pecuniary losses suffered by the plaintiff were not recoverable in the
absence of any property damage. 8J The court found that the negligent
7J

71. Id. at 860-61.
72. Id. at 861.
73. Id. at 868 (citing Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. Ct. App.
1965».
74. [d. at 868-69 (citing Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305 (N.J.
1965».
75. [d. at 871.
76. [d. at 870-7 I.
77. Western Seed Prod. Corp. v. Campbell, 442 P.2d 215 (Or. 1968); Nobility
Homes v. Shivers, 557 S. W .2d 77 (Tex. 1977) (affirming judgment for plaintiff
in negligence without discussion); Berg v. General Motors Corp., 555 P.2d 818
(Wash. 1976).
78. See supra part lIl.A.
79. 555 P.2d 818 (Wash. 1976), superseded by WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72 et seq.
(1993).
80. [d. at 818-19.
81. [d. at 822-23.
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manufacture of the engine created the foreseeable risk that the
plaintiff's enterprise would be halted and that lost profits would be
incurred. 82 The court failed to recognize any "distinction that would
allow recovery if the product in question destroyed the property of
another, yet would deny recovery were the same product merely to
disintegrate. "83 The requirement of personal injury or property damage, the court reasoned, only inheres in strict liability actions. 84 The
court therefore concluded that "nothing in the tort of negligence ...
prevents lost profits from being a specie of recompensable harm
which is actionable against the remote manufacturer. "85
The Supreme Court of Oregon has also allowed recovery for
purely economjc loss. In State ex reI. Western Seed Production Corp.
v. l.R. Campbell,86 the court held that sugar beet farmers could
recover in negligence for crop losses caused by defects in seeds
manufactured by the defendant. 87 The court acknowledged that other
courts limited negligence liability for purely economic losses to situations in which the loss occurred "in a violent or dangerous accident."88 The court, however, saw no reason why the availability of
a tort remedy should depend on whether the damage occurs ina
traumatic fashion. 89 A manufacturer, it stated, should owe a duty to
avoid foreseeable harm to the users of its product. 90
1994]

B.

The "Sudden and Calamitous" Exception

In recent years, an intermediate form of the economic loss
doctrine-or perhaps more accurately, an exception to it-has developed. This exception permits recovery in negligence or strict liability for injury to the product itself when the damage occurs in a
sudden, calamitous, and dangerous manner. 91 Rather than focus on
82.
83.
84.
85.

at 823.
at 822.
at 823.
Although the court failed to make such a distinction, this decision was
decided under admiralty law, as were the decisions relied upon by the court.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

86. 442 P.2d 215 (Or. 1968), cerl. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969).
87. [d. at 218-19.
88. [d. at 218.
89. [d.
90. [d.

91. See, e.g., Agristor Leasing v. Guggisberg, 617 F. Supp. 902, 908 n.4 (D. Minn.
1985) (holding that damage to animal feed caused by defendant's feed storage
system "was not caused by sudden calamitous occurrence, but was a rise of
product ineffectiveness"); Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 579 F. Supp. 893
(S.D. Ind. 1984), a/I'd, 771 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that economic
loss may not be recovered in negligence action based on a sudden and calamitous
occurrence); Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248, 251 (Alaska 1977) (holding
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whether damage has occurred to "other property," the exception
focuses instead on the nature of the defect and the manner in which
the damage occurred. 92 When the defect in the product results in
deterioration, internal breakage, depreciation, or failure to live up
to the purchaser's expectations, courts invoking this exception will
permit recovery only under contract or warranty law. 93 However,
where the damage results in a hazardous condition, through a sudden
and calamitous occurrence, these same courts permit recovery under
tort law. 94 The "sudden and calamitous" exception, as one court
observed, marks the distinction between "the disappointed users ...
and the endangered ones. "95
In Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor CO.,96
one of the leading cases on this subject, the Third Circuit addressed
whether, under Pennsylvania law, an accidental injury to a product
itself as a result of a hazardous defect would constitute economic
loss or physical property damage. 97 The plaintiff, in Caterpillar, had.
purchased a front-end tractor loader from the defendant manufacturer and used it without incident for four years.98 While the loader
was in operation, a fire suddenly broke out and the machine was
severely damaged. 99 The court stated:
In cases
product
whether
physical

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

97.
98.
99.

such as the present one where only the defective
is damaged, the majority approach is to identify
a particular injury amounts to economic loss or
damage. In drawing this distinction, the items for

that damage to trailer from fire caused by the ignition of polyurethane padding
in carpet of trailer was "sudden and calamitous" damage and not deterioration,
internal breakage, or depreciation that would be considered economic loss);
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 450 (III. 1982)
(holding that crack that developed in grain storage tank was not sudden and
dangerous occurrence, but rather "a qualitative defect relating to the purchaser's expectation in terms of the product's fitness to perform its intended
function"); Industrial Uniform Rental Co. v. International Harvester Co., 463
A.2d 1085 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983); see also Barrett, supra note 12, at 914-16;
Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REV.
917, 918 (1966).
See Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165
(3d Cir. 1981); Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 579 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Ind.
1984), aiI'd, 771 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1985).
Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assocs. Architects, Inc., 354
N.W.2d 816,821 (Minn. 1984), overruled in part by Hapka v. Panquin Farms,
458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990).
[d. at 821.
Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 575 P.2d 1383, 1387 (Or. 1978).
652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981).
[d. at 1166-67.
ld. at 1166.
[d.

1994]

Economic Loss

535

which damages are sought, such as repair costs, are not
determinative. Rather, the line between tort and contract
must be drawn by analyzing interrelated factors such as the

nature of the defect, the type of risk, and the manner in
which the injury arose. IOO
Applying these factors, the Third Circuit found that the nature of
the risk, a fire, was a "sudden and highly dangerous occurrence," 101
and that the alleged defect, a faulty design in the hydraulic line,
constituted "a safety hazard that posed a serious risk of harm to
person and property." 102 The court therefore held that under Pennsylvania law, damages incurred to the product itself would not be
treated as an economic loss when the injury stemmed from a hazardous defect and was brought about by a sudden and highly
dangerous occurrence. 103
Several courts appear to have adopted a variation of the sudden
and calamitous exception that permits recovery in tort for damage
to the product itself, but only where the damage takes place in a
manner that creates an identifiable risk of injury to persons or other
property.l04 Stated otherwise, sudden, violent damage to the product
itself would be insufficient to permit recovery in tort if the product
posed no threat to anything or anyone other than the product itself.
For example, in Northern Power & Engineering Corp. v. Caterpillar
Tractor CO.,105 the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of an electric
generator when the oil pressure valve of the generator failed to
function, causing severe damage to the engine. 106 Although the damage occurred in a sudden manner, no persons or other property were
harmed.107 The court therefore denied the plaintiff's tort claim. lOS
100. Id. (emphasis added). As another court has noted:
Deciding whether there was a violent occurrence does not depend on
the nature of the product. It depends on the nature of the .incident
that caused the damage .... [E)xploding bottles, runaway barges,
flying saw blades, and incendiary packages [are the) types of accidents
that are likely to cause bodily injuries or damage to other products
that are traditionally recoverable in tort.
City of Clayton v. Grumman Energy Prods., Inc., 576 F. Supp. 1122, 1126
(E.D. Mo. 1983).
101. Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F .2d 1165,
1174 (3d Cir. 1981).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1175.
104. See, e.g., Northern Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d
324 (Alaska 1981); Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977); Russell
v. Ford Motor Co., 575 P.2d. 1383 (Or. 1978).
105. 623 P.2d 324 (Alaska 1981).
106. Id. at 326.
107. Id. at 329.
108. Id. at 330.
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The United States Supreme Court has altogether rejected the
"sudden and calamitous" exception in East River Steamship Corp.
v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc. 109 The petitioner in East River filed an
admiralty complaint against Transamerica, alleging that it was strictly
liable for certain design defects in turbines installed in the petitioner's
vessels .. 10 In examining whether the remedy for damages to the
turbines properly lied in a tort action, the Court observed that even
where the harm to the product occurs through an abrupt,accidentlike event, "the resulting loss due to repair costs, decreased value,
and lost profits is essentially the failure of the purchaser 1.0 receive
the benefit of its bargain-traditionally the core concern of contract
law." III The "maintenance of product value and quality is precisely
the purpose of express and implied warranties."112 The concern for
personal safety evidence by tort law is reduced or not implicated
when the injury is only to the product itself. 113
C. A Manufacturer's Liability Under Maryland Law for
Economic Loss
Maryland's appellate courts have recently adopted a novel approach to the recovery of economic loss in the context of a products
liability action. Applying the "risk of harm" analysis first set forth
in the Atlantis decision, the court of appeals in A.J. Decoster v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp.114 and the court of special appeals in
109. 476 V.S. 858 (1986).
110. [d. at 861.
Ill. [d. at 870. Deans Prosser and Keeton have observed:
Making liability depend upon whether or not the loss results from an
"accident" creates a difficult issue and arguably an irrelevant issue
with respect to the validity of contract provisions allocating the risk
of loss for harm to the defective product itself to the purchaser.
Distinguishing "accidental" damage to the product from mere economic loss is difficult in many cases.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 101(3), at 709.
112. East River, 476 V.S. at 872.
113. [d. at 871-72. Dean Keeton appears 'to agree with the Supreme Court. He has
stated:
A distinction should be made between the type of "dangerous condition" that causes damage only to the product itself and the type
that is dangerous to other property or persons. A hazardous product
that has harmed something or someone can be labeled a part of the
accident problem; tort law seeks to protect against this type of harm
through allocation of risk. In contrast, a damaging event that harms
only the product should be treated as irrelevant to policy considerations
directing liability placement in tort. Consequently, if a defect causes
damage limited solely to the property, recovery should be available if
at all on a contract-warranty theory.
W. Page Keeton, Annual Survey 0/ Texas Law on Torts, 32 Sw. L.l. 1 (1978).
114. 333 Md. 245, 634 A.2d 1330 (1994).
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Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving llS have held that a plaintiff may
recover under a negligence theory for purely economic losses, including harm to the product itself, if the defect in the product causes a
dangerous condition creating a risk of death or personal injury to
the consumer. 116 Although the courts in A.J. Decoster and Morris
did not ultimately award economic losses to the plaintiffs, the decisions mark an important turning point in Maryland law in the
products liability area.
In A.J. Decoster, the court of appeals addressed for the first
time in the products liability setting, the "distinction between property loss and pure economic loss in determining whether a claim may
be brought under a tort or contract theory or both." 117 The plaintiff
in the suit was a commercial chicken and egg producer who purchased
an electrical transfer switch designed to detect and respond to any
loss of electrical power in the ventilation system at its chicken
houses.1I8 When a power failure occurred, the switch did not sense
the loss of power and failed to activate the backup power system. 119
As a result, the plaintiff's ventilation system overheated and shut
down, suffocating over 140,000 chickens. 12o The plaintiff filed suit
against Westinghouse, the manufacturer of the switch, alleging counts
of negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty.121 Westinghouse
sought to dismiss the negligence claim on the basis that the plaintiff
had alleged only economic losses.1 22
The court of appeals framed the issue in A.J. Decoster as
whether the plaintiff's damages could be considered "physical harm
or economic losses and, if the latter, whether the defective switch
caused a dangerous condition creating a risk of death or personal
injury to humans. "123 The court did not reach the second part of
this determination because it found that the death of the plaintiff's
chickens was a loss of physical property, rather than an economic
loss, and was therefore recoverable. 124 The ~ourt reasoned that the
plaintiff was not seeking to recover the loss of the value of the

115. 99 Md. App. 646, 639 A.2d 147, cert. granted, 336 Md. 98,646 A.2d 1018
(1994).
116. A.J. Decoster, 333 Md. at 251-53, 634 A.2d at 1333-34; Morris, 99 Md. App.
at 654-55, 639 A.2d at 151-52.
117. 333 Md. at 247, 634 A.2d at 1331.
118. [d. The plaintiff originally alleged that it purchased the switch from Westinghouse, the manufacturer, but later conceded that it purchased the switch from
a dealer. [d. at 248 n.l, 634 A.2d at 1331 n.1.
119. [d. at 247, 634 A.2d at 1331.
120. [d. at 247-48, 634 A.2d at 1331.
121. [d.
122. [d. at 248-49, 634 A.2d at 1331-32.
123. [d. at 251, 634 A.2d at 1333.
124. [d.
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switch, the costs to repair or replace the switch, or any lost profits
from the plaintiff's diminished egg production. 125 Rather, the plaintiff
sought the replacement value of the chickens, which constituted
property that was "wholly distinct from the allegedly defective product." 126 The court held that a manufacturer may be held liable for
physical harm to person or property, other than the product itself,
caused by defects in its products "because it is charged with the
responsibility to ensure that its products meet a standard of safety
creating no unreasonable risk of harm." 127
The court of special appeals was faced with a more challenging
situation in Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving,128 where there was
no damage to "other property." The plaintiffs in Morris were a
group of homeowners who alleged that the fire retardant treated
(FRT) plywood used to construct the roofs of their townhomes had
deteriorated, resulting in impairment of the strength and structural
integrity of the roofs.129 The plaintiffs sued the manufacturers of the
FRT plywood under negligence and strict liability theories, seeking
damages for the expenses of inspecting, repairing, and replacing the
roofs. 130 Invoking Atlantis, the plaintiffs contended that the condition
of the roofs created a risk of personal injury since injury could result
from walking on the roofs or from a collapse of the roofs, although
no personal injuries had yet occurred. 131

125. [d. at 252, 634 A.2d at 1333.
126. [d. at 253, 634 A.2d at 1334. The only other reported decision in Maryland
·in which there was damage to "other property" is Worm v. American Cyanamid
Co., 20 U.C.C. Rep. Servo 2d (Callaghan) 441 (D. Md. 1992), a/I'd, 5 F.3d
774 (4th Cir. 1993). In Worm, three commercial farmers sued the manufacturer
of "Scepter," a herbicide, for damages sustained to their corn crop. [d. at
441. The farmers had used the herbicide successfully in a prior harvest of
soybeans. [d. After the soybean harvest, the farmers planted corn on 74 acres
of land that had previously been treated with Scepter. [d. When the corn crop
failed to meet commercial standards for sale, the farmers sued the manufacturer
for negligently failing to test Scepter and negligently failing to properly for·
mulate and manufacture the product. [d. at 442.
Applying Maryland law, the district court acknowledged that the Court of
Appeals of Maryland had not definitively resolved the issue, first broached in
Atlantis and Jacques, whether, in the absence of privity, Maryland recognizes
negligence actions when no personal injury damages are claimed. [d. The
district court refused to "needlessly anticipate the development of state tort
law," and concluded that, whatever the result of this inquiry, the plaintiff
farmers had not generated sufficient issues of fact to withstand the manufac·
turer's motion for summary judgment. [d.
127. A.J. Decoster, 333 Md. at 250-51,634 A.2d at 1332.
128. 99 Md. App. 646, 639 A.2d 147, cert. granted, 336 Md. 98, 646 A.2d 1018
(1994).
129. [d. at 650, 639 A.2d at 150.
130. [d.
131. [d. at 655-56, 639 A.2d at 152.
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The court was quick to distinguish the plaintiffs' damages from
those alleged in A tlantis, noting that "this is not a case where a
sudden fire could reasonably be calculated to result in serious physical
injury or death in addition to property damage." 132 Rather, the court
found that the damage to the roofs was qualitative in nature because
it occurred through gradual deterioration of the plywood.133 The
plaintiffs alleged only that the plywood had "darkened, spotted,
warped and fractured." 134 Thus, the court found that the damage to
the FR T plywood fell short of creating a clear danger of death or
personal injury.135 The court upheld the lower court's dismissal of
the plaintiffs' negligence count on the basis that they had alleged in
merely "conclusory terms" that someone could be hurt if they were
walking on the roof, or if a heavy snowfall occurred triggering a
collapse .1 36 "Mere possibilities," the court held, "do not meet the
threshold of establishing a clear danger of death or personal injury. "137
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland
applied Atlantis in one decision, but denied recovery against the
defendant manufacturer because its defective product had not presented a risk of personal injury to the purchaser of the product or
others. In In re Lone Star Industries, Inc., Concrete Railroad Cross
Ties Litigation, 138 the district court found that premature cracking
and deterioration of concrete railroad ties purchased by the plaintiff,
Amtrak, did not pose a "clear danger of death or personal injury."139
By the plaintiff's own admission, only 6.80/0 of the ties had lost
some of their load bearing capacity and n"eeded to be replaced. l40
The court found that the danger of the ties failing and causing a
derailment or other calamitous event was "merely speculative at best

132.
133.
134.
135.

[d. at 655, 639 A.2d at 152.
[d.
[d.
[d. The plaintiffs had owned their townhouses for six to ten years and had
yet to replace the roofs for fear of personal injury. [d. at 655, 639 A.2d at

152.
136. [d. at 655, 639 A.2d at 152.
137. [d. at 655-56, 639 A.2d at 152. One inevitable result of the Atlantis decision

has beel} that in support of their negligence claims, plaintiffs typically allege
in their complaint as a matter of course that the defendant's negligence created
a risk of personal injury. The court's holding in Morris indicates that it will
not involve itself in the business of rubber stamping complaints and denying
motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment merely because a
plaintiff has perfunctorily alleged in the complaint that a risk of personal
injury exists.
138. 776 F. Supp. 206 (D. Md. 1991).
139. [d. at 222.
140. [d.
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and [was] not the type of circumstance which would support the
assertion of a tort claim."141
Prior to these decisions, the Maryland courts had never before
applied the "risk of harm" approach in a products liability suit. The
few decisions by the state's courts that addressed the economic loss
doctrine generally followed the majority approach in the countrypermitting recovery under a negligence theory only where the harm
resulting from a defective product was in the form of personal injury
or damage to "other property." 142 Whenever injury to the product
itself was incurred, such as qualitative defects in the product or
losses that were purely pecuniary in nature, Maryland courts invariably denied recovery in tort by a third party.143 For example, in
Excavation Construction, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 144 a construction
company sued the manufacturer of defective dump trucks in negligence and for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. 145
The plaintiff claimed as damages the financial losses incurred when
the trucks were idle for a period of time .146 The district court held
that the defendant was entitled to summary judgment on the negligence count, finding that the Maryland courts would not extend a
manufacturer's liability to that type of economic injury. 147
Interestingly, the court indicated that it would recognize a distinction between two types of harm that may occur "to the product
itself"-physical damage to the product and pecuniary loss without
physical harm to the product. 148 The court quoted with approval an
oft-cited passage from Dean Prosser:
There can be no doubt that the seller's liability for negligence
covers any kind of physical harm, including not only personal injuries, but also property damage to the defective
chattel itself, ... as well as damage to other property in
the vicinity. But where there is no accident, and no physical
damage, and the only loss is a pecuniary one, through the
141. Id. at 223.
142. See, e.g., Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 20 U.CC Rep. Servo (Callaghan)
441 (D. Md. 1992), a/i'd, 5 F.3d 774 (4th Cir. 1993) (granting defendant
manufacturer's motion for summary judgment on tort claims brought for
damages to "other property").
143. See In re Lone Star Indus., Inc., Concrete R.R. Cross Ties Litig., 776 F.
Supp. 206 (D. Md. 1991); Wood Prods., Inc. v. CMI Corp., 651 F. Supp.
641 (D. Md. 1986); Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc. V. Toshiba Corp.,
576 F. Supp. 312 (D. Md. 1983); Excavation Constr., Inc. v. Mack Trucks,
Inc., 31 U.CC. Rep. Servo (Callaghan) 1386 (D. Md. 1981).
144. 31 U.CC Rep. Servo (Callaghan) 1386 (D. Md. 1981).
145. Id. at 1387.
146. [d.
147. Id. at 1391-92.
148. Id. at 1390-91.

1994]

Economic Loss

541

loss of the value or use of the thing sold, or the cost of
repairing it, the courts have adhered to the rule ... that
purely economic interests are not entitled to protection
against mere negligence, and so have denied recovery. 149
Thus, the court implied that it would hold a manufacturer liable in
negligence if there was harm to the product that was physical in
nature, but would not hold the manufacturer liable if the plaintiff
suffered purely pecuniary losses .150 The plaintiff in Excavation Construction was clearly seeking damages from this latter category by
bringing suit for lost profits incurred as a result of the idle truckS.ISI
Though the decision does not describe the nature of the "defect"
afflicting the trucks, the court apparently concluded that no physical
damage had occurred to the trucks themselves.
In addition to purely pecuniary losses, the district court has also
held that qualitative defects in a product, such as those incurred in
Morris, are not recoverable in a negligence action against a manufacturer. In Wood Products, Inc. v. eMI Corp.,m the plaintiff had
purchased a wood furnace from the defendant manufacturer for use
in its milling business. 153 Shortly after the furnace was installed,
problems developed as a result of defects in its design and manufacture. IS4 The evidence presented to the court revealed that the drum
of the furnace was "too thin" and "too flexible"; the air distribution
tubes "sagged and failed"; the seals of the furnace "were of a lesser
quality than had been promised"; only one of several thermocouplers
"ever worked satisfactorily"; and temperatures within the furnace
"were frequently excessive." 155 The furnace simply "never [had] and

149. Id. at 1391 (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 101, at 665) (emphasis
added). In the fifth edition of his treatise, Prosser takes a decidedly different
view of when damage to the property itself is recompensable:
Making liability depend upon whether or not the loss results from an
"accident" creates a difficult issue and arguably an irrelevant issue
with respect to the validity of contract provisions allocating the risk
of loss for harm to the defective product itself to the purchaser.
Distinguishing "accidental" damage to the product from mere economic loss is difficult in many cases.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 101(3), at 709.
150. In the passage quoted by the court, Dean Prosser indicates that some "accident"
to the chattel is required in a negligence action against the manufacturer.
Whether this is a reference to the "sudden and calamitous" exception is
unclear. Arguably, any type of physical harm to a product is an accident, even
where it does not occur in a sudden and calamitous manner.
151. Excavation Construction, 31 V.C.C. Rep. Servo (Callaghan) at 1387.
152. 651 F. Supp. 641 (D. Md. 1986).
153. Id. at 644.
154. Id. at 646.
155. Id.
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never [would] work."156 The court stated that it "doubt[ed] that the
furnace could ever hav~ functioned for its intended purpose."157 The
court dismissed the plaintiff's negligence claim against the manufacturer on the ground that the plaintiff alleged only damages for
economic loss,158 although it failed to discuss why the harm to the
furnace was characterized as such. It is apparent, however, that the
defects and deficiencies in the furnace were of a qualitative nature,
rather than the result of physical harm to property-either "other
property" or the product itself. Warranty law therefore provided the
appropriate remedy.
Thus, Morris, Excavation Construction, and Wood Products
indicate that there are two instances under Maryland law in which a
plaintiff may not recover economic losses in a negligence action: (1)
when purely pecuniary harm has been incurred, or (2) when the
damage to the product is merely qualitative in nature and not in the
form of actual physical harm. When the harm incurred to the product
falls into either category, the policy reasons supporting the application
of the economic loss doctrine are perhaps at their strongest. 1S9 The
risk that a purchaser of a product might sustain purely pecuniary
injury, such as lost profits, is a risk that typically is, or should be,
assumed by a contract between the parties. Likewise, qualitative
deficiencies in a product, such as those incurred in Wood Products
and Morris, are the type of harm that statutory warranties are
designed to remedy. A manufacturer, it is argued, "does not assume
responsibility for the commercial viability or economic performance
of the item sold. "160 As the court of appeals stated in A. J. Decoster:
The distinction between tort recovery for physical injury
and warranty recovery for economic loss derives from policy
considerations which allocate the risks related to a defective
product between the seller' and the purchaser. A manufacturer may be held liable for physical injuries, including harm
to property, caused by defects in its products because it is
charged with the responsibility of ensuring that its products
meet a standard of safety creating no unreasonable risk of
harm. However, where the loss is purely economic, the
manufacturer cannot be charged with the responsibility of
ensuring that the product meet the particular expectations
of the consumer unless it is aware of those expectations and

156.
157.
15S.
159.
160.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 64S.

See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
Berg v. General Motors Corp., 555 P.2d SIS, SI9 (Wash. 1976), superseded
by WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72 et seq. (1993).
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has agreed that the product will meet them. Thus, generally,
the only recovery for a purely economic loss would be under
a contract theory.161

D. Recovery of Economic Loss Against Manufacturers Under
Other Causes of Action-Strict Liability, Negligent
Misrepresentation, and Breach of Express and Implied Warranties l62
Alternative theories under which a plaintiff' might attempt to
recover economic losses against a manufacturer in the absence of
privity include strict liability, negligent misrepresentation, and breach
of warranty. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland has indicated
that these theories are not duplicative and, therefore, may be brought
as independent, parallel bases of recovery. 163
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Phipps v. General Motors
Corp.,I64 adopted the theory of strict liability set forth in section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which expressly rejects
the privity requirement when a party sues a manufacturer in strict
liability.165 Section 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition

unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby

161. 333 Md. 245,250-51,634 A.2d 1330, 1332-33 (1994).
162. This Comment provides only cursory coverage of the economic loss rule under
causes of action other than negligence.
163. Dechello v. Johnson Enters., 74 Md. App. 228, 235 n.4, 536 A.2d 1203, 1207
n.4, cert. denied, 312 Md. 601, 541 A.2d 964 (1988); Valk Mfg. Co. v.
Rangaswamy, 74 Md. App. 304,310, 537 A.2d 622, 625 (1988), rev'd en bane,
Montgomery City v. Valk Mfg. Co., 317 Md. 185, 562 A.2d 1246 (1989).
164. 278 Md. 337, 353, 363 A.2d 955, 963 (1976). In Phipps, Judge Eldridge
explained the following reasons for imposing strict liability on manufacturers:
(I) manufacturers are better able financially to bear the risk of loss, (2)
consumers rely on manufacturers in expecting that the products they purchase
will be safe for their intended purposes, and that this expectation is better met
by strict liability than negligence, and (3) the requirement that the defect in a
product render it unreasonably dangerous is a sufficient showing of fault to
warrant imposing liability. [d. at 343, 363 A.2d at 958.
165. For a plaintiff to recover under strict liability, it must be established that: (I)
the product was in defective condition at the time it left the possession or
control of the' seller, (2) the product was unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer, (3) the defect in the product was the cause of the plaintiff's
injuries, and (4) the product was expected to and did reach the consumer
without substantial change in its condition. Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 304
Md. 124, 134, 497 A.2d 1143, 1147 (1985) (citing Phipps v. General Motors
Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976»; Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc.,
303 Md. 581, 495 A.2d 348 (1985); Sheehan v. Anthony Pools, 50 Md. App.
614, 440 A.2d 1085 (1982), a/I'd, 295 Md. 285, 455 A.2d 434 (1983).
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caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property,
if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such
a p"roduct, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is
sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relation with the
seller. 166
Section 402A(2)(b) grants the right of recovery to both the
"user"167 and "consumer"168 of a product, despite their lack of
privity because neither person purchased the product directly from
the manufacturer. In fact, the court of special appeals has determined that the scope of liability under the terms "user" and "consumer" extends to even mere "bystanders." 169
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964) (emphasis added). The Maryland courts have also adopted the theory, similar to that set forth in § 402A,
that "privity is not required to maintain a suit against a manufacturer or seller
for an injury sustained in the use of a chattel which is likely to be dangerous
jar the use jar which it was supplied." Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Servs.,
Inc., 326 F. Supp. 709,716-17 (D. Md. 1971) (emphasis added). This theory
is set forth in § 388 of the Restatement, which provides as follows:
Chattel Known to be Dangerous for Intended Use
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for
another to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should
expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be
endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use
of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose
use it is supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is likely to be
dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is
supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1964); see also Excavation Constr.,
Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 31 U.CC Rep. Servo (Callaghan) 1386 (D. Md.
1981); Babylon V. Scruton, 215 Md. 299, 138 A.2d 375 (1958); Kaplan V. Stein,
198 Md. 414, 84 A.2d 81 (1951).
167. A "user" is defined in comment 1 as a person who passively enjoys the benefit
of the product. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. 1 (1964).
168. A "consumer" is defined as one who purchases a product or who is a member
of the family of the final pu"rchaser, his employee, his guest, or a donee of
the purchaser. [d.
169. Va1k Mfg. CO. V. Rangaswamy, 74 Md. App. 304, 323, 537 A.2d 622, 627
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In Phipps, the court of appeals applied the strict liability theory
in a case involving personal injuries caused by a defective product. 170
The court held that the plaintiff, who was injured when the car he
was driving suddenly accelerated and crashed into a tree, had stated
a cause of action under section 402A against the manufacturer of
the car despite the lack of privi ty. 171
The Maryland courts have not applied section 402A to allow a
plaintiff to recover purely economic loss in the form of either
pecuniary losses or qualitative defects in a product. In those few
decisions that have addressed the issue, the courts have held that
such claims cannot be brought under either a strict liability or a
negligence theory.172 In A.1. Decoster, however, application of section 402A was extended for the first time to damage other than
personal injury. 173 The plaintiff in A.1. Decoster, in addition to a
negligence claim, also brought a strict liability claim for the death
of its chickens, which the court characterized as damage to "other
property." 174 In its motion to dismiss the strict liability count, the
defendant argued that the legislature's enactment of warranty remedies under the vee created a comprehensive scheme of recovery for
economic losses that preempted the field' of products liability. 175
Relying on Phipps and a literal reading Of section 402A,176 the court

170.
171.
172.

173.
174.
175.

176.

(1988), rev'd en bane, Montgomery City v. Valk Mfg. Co., 317 Md. 185, 562
A.2d 1246 (1989). Most other jurisdictions in the country provide relief to
bystanders under § 402A. Id. at 322-33, 537 A.2d at 629-32.
Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 307, 353, 363 A.2d 955, 963 (1976).
Id.
In re Lone Star Indus., Inc., Concrete R.R. Cross Ties Litig., 776 F. Supp.
206, 221-22 (D. Md. 1991) (characterizing deterioration damage to railroad ties
as economic loss and denying recovery of such loss in negligence and strict
liability action against the manufacturer of ties); Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F. Supp. 312, 325-26 (D. Md. 1983) (denying
recovery of economic losses in both strict liability and negligence, without
distinguishing the two theories).
The United States Supreme Court has likewise held that a products liability
claim, whether based on a theory of negligence or strict liability, cannot be
asserted when the only.injury claimed is purely economic loss. East River S.S.
Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986). See supra parts
lILA-B. This is generally the approach taken by most states in the country.
For a discussion of this approach and the minority approach, which holds that
purely economic losses are recoverable in strict liability, see Joe E. Manuel &
Gregory B. Richards, Economic Loss in Strict Liability-Beyond the Realm oj
402A, 16 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 315 (1986).
333 Md. 245, 258, 634 A.2d 1330, 1336 (1994).
Id. at 253, 634 A.2d at 1332.
Id. at 255, 634 A.2d at 1334-35.
The court noted that § 402A(I) describes the applicable seller as "[o]ne who
sells any product in, a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or to his property" and further provides that a seller is liable for
"physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer or his
property." Id. at 258, 634 A.2d at 1336.
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of appeals rejected the defendant's preemption argument and held
that "[i]t is beyond question that § 402A applies not only to accidental injuries to consumers or users of a product, but also to injury
to the property of the user or consumer." 177 The court based its
holding primarily on equitable principles, reasoning that fairness
required recovery for injuries to person and property resulting from
unreasonably dangerous conditions. 178 A consumer, the court stated,
does not simply lose the benefit of his bargain when a product proves
defective, but rather sustains damage to other property because the
defect is so dangerous in nature. 179 The court concluded that a
consumer does not "bargain[] for destruction of his property any
more than he should be considered to have bargained for physical
injury to himself or others."18o
In negligent misrepresentation actions,181 the Maryland courts
have permitted recovery of economic losses only in certain instances. 182 The courts have, for example, allowed (l) a plaintiff to
recover against a mortgage broker for economic losses incurred in
relying on the broker's advice;183 (2) a prospective homeowner to
recover against a developer for a grossly inaccurate estimate of water
and sewer connection charges;184 and (3) a plaintiff to recover for
overpayment of a stock purchase as a result of a brokerage's negligent
misrepresentations. 18s The. courts have not, however, permitted the
recovery of purely economic losses in a products liability setting

177.
178.
179.
180.

[d.
[d. at 259, 634 A.2d at 1337.
[d.
[d. at 259-60, 634 A.2d at 1337.

181. The elements of negligent misrepresentation are as follows:
(I) the defendant, owing a duty of care to the plaintiff, negligently
asserts a false statement;
(2) the defendant intends that his statement will be acted upon by the
plaintiff;
(3) the defendant has knowledge that the plaintiff will probably rely
on the statement, which, if erroneous, will cause loss or injury;
(4) the plaintiff, justifiably, takes action in reliance on the statement;
and
(5) the plaintiff suffers damage proximately caused by the defendant's
negligence.
Weisman v. Connors, 312 Md. 428, 444, 540 A.2d 783, 791 (1988) (citing
Martens Chevrolet v. Seney, 292 Md. 328, 337, 439 A.2d 534, 539 (1982».
182. See, e.g., St. Paul at Chase Corp. v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 262 Md.
192,278 A.2d 12, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971); Brack v. Evans, 230 Md.
548, 187 A.2d 880 (1963); Ward Dev. Co. v. Ingrao, 63 Md. App. 645, 493
A.2d 421 (1985).
183. See St. Paul, 262 Md. 192, 278 A.2d 12.
184. See Ingrao, 63 Md. App. 645, 493 A.2d 421.
185. See Brack, 230 Md. 548, 187 A.2d 880.
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based on a negligent misrepresentation theory. 186 Generally, the courts
reason th<l;t Maryland's "pervasive statutory scheme" governing warranty claims adequately· protects plaintiffs against economic losses
caused by the misrepresentations of a seller or manufacturer regarding
their products. 18?
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland addressed the applicability of the economic loss doctrine in a negligent misrepresentation
action in Boatel Industries, Inc. v. Hester. 188 The plaintiffs in Boatel
Industries purchased a yacht which proved to have a cracked hull
and other design and structural defects rendering it unseaworthy. 189
They brought suit against the manufacturer of the yacht for breach
of warranty and negligent misrepresentations allegedly made by the
manufacturer concerning the construction and seaworthiness of the
yacht. 190 The court of special appeals found that the unseaworthy
and unsafe condition of the yacht created "a risk of death or personal
injury" to plaintiffs. 191 Citing Atlantis, 192 the court noted that because
the plaintiffs had not incurred physical injuries, their damages were
entirely economic in nature. 193 Further, the court noted that under
Atlantis a claimant need not wait for personal injury to occur before
bringing a negligence action. 194 Nevertheless, the court refused to
extend Atlantis to cases of negligent misrepresentation. 195 The court
reasoned that the damages recoverable for negligent misrepresentation-the reasonable cost of correcting the dangerous condition"":"'are
"included within the damages recoverable under the warranty
counts. "196

186. Flow Indus., Inc. v. Fields Constr. Co., 683 F. Supp. 527 (D. Md. 1988);
Wood Prods., Inc. v. CMI Corp., 651 F. Supp. 641 (D. Md. 1986); Copiers
Typewriters Calculators v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F. Supp. 312 (D. Md. 1983);
Boatel Indus. v. Hester, 77 Md. App. 284, 550 A.2d 389 (1988).
187. Wood Prods., 651 F. Supp. at 648.
188. 77 Md. App. 284, 550 A.2d 389 (1988).
189. [d. Other problems plaguing the vessel included engine and generator malfunctions, air conditioning and heating problems, and an excessive fuel consumption rate. [d. at 293, 550 A.2d at 394.
190. [d. at 307, 550 A.2d at 397·98.
191. [d. at 308, 550 A.2d at 401.
192. 308 Md. 18, 517 A.2d 336 (1986).
193. Boatel, 77 Md. App. at 307, 550 A.2d at 401. The court implied that in
products liability cases, personal injury is a necessary element of a cause of
action for negligent misrepresentation. [d. (citing Weisman v. Connors, 312
Md. 428, 540 A.2d 783 (1988».
194. [d.
195. [d.
196. [d.; see also Wood Prods., Inc. v. CMI Corp., 651 F. Supp. 641, 648 (D.

Md. 1986) (denying plaintiff's negligent misrepresentation claim against manufacturer for false statements regarding capabilities of and improvements to
wood furnace, on basis that "[a) pervasive statutory scheme governs warranty
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In claims for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability,
the privity requirement has been expressly abolished by the Maryland
General Assembly.197 Protection under this warranty extends not only
to a party who purchases the product for resale to a consumer, but
also to the ultimate consumer. 198 The plaintiff who brings an action
for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability may recover
economic losses as "incidental" or "consequential" damages under
section 2-715 of the Commercial Law Article of the Maryland Code.l 99
In claims for either breach of the express warranty or breach of
the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, the privity
requirement has also been expressly eliminated, but only when the

claims in product liability cases, and it appears inappropriate to extend theories
of negligent misrepresentation into an area where the General Assembly has
carefully determined who may assert what claims against whom").
197. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-314(l)(a)-(b) (1976). Subsections (a) and (b)
of § 2-314(1) provide as follows:
(a) In §§ 2-314 through 2-318 of this title, "seller" includes the
manufacturer, distributor, dealer, wholesaler or other middleman or
retailer; and
(b) Any previous requirement of privity is abolished as between the
buyer and seller in any action brought by the buyer.
[d.; see Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F. Supp.
312, 322-23 (D. Md. 1983). Maryland is one of only a few states which has
altered the Uniform Commercial Code to expressly abolish the privity requirement. THOMAS M. QUINN, QUINN'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY
AND LAW DfGEST 2-229 (2d ed. 1991).
198. Sheeskin v. Giant Food, Inc., 20 Md. App. 611, 318 A.2d 874 (1974), a/I'd,
273 Md. 592, 332 A.2d I (1975); Erdman v. Johnson Bros. Radio & Television
Co., 260 Md. 190, 271 A.2d 744 (1970).
199. Section 2-715 provides:
(I) Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and
care and custody of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in connection with effecting
cover and any other reasonable expense incident to the delay or other
breach.
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include
(a) Any loss resulting from the general or particular requirements
and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason
to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover
or otherwise; and
(b) Injury to person or property proximately resulting from any
breach of warranty.
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-715 (1992).
For example, in Excavation Construction, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 311
U.C.C. Rep. Servo (Callaghan) 1386 (D. Md. 1981), the court held that
economic losses, in the form of lost profits incurred by the plaintiff while its
trucks were idle, were consequential damages within the meaning of § 2-715(2).
[d. at 1388.
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plaintiff has suffered personal injury. 200 When only economic loss is
incurred, privity is required in an action brought pursuant to either
of these theories. 201
As Boatel Industries indicates, a plaintiff is most likely to recover
economic losses in a breach of warranty action brought under Maryland's Commercial Law Article.202 There are obvious advantages to
bringing a breach of warranty claim, the most significant of which
is that a plaintiff may recover without proving negligence on the
part of the manufacturer or seller. 203 The plaintiff need only demonstrate the existence of the warranty, a breach of that warranty,
and that the breach was the proximate cause of the loss sustained. 204
Any knowledge of the defect by the manufacturer or seller, or any
lack of care, is irrelevant. 20S

200. Section 2-318 of the Commercial Law Article extends a seller's warranties,
whether express or implied,
to any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer
or who is a guest in his home or any other ultimate consumer or user
of the goods or person affected thereby if it is reasonable to expect
that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and
who is injured in person by breach- of the warranty.
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-318 (1992) (emphasis added).
201. See Wood Prods., Inc. v. CMI Corp., 651 F. Supp. 641, 649 (D. Md. 1986).
In Wood Products, the court found that there was privity between the buyer
of the defective furnace and the furnace manufacturer, and that the buyer
could therefore recover economic losses on a breach of implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose theory. [d. Interestingly, the court also found
that even assuming that the parties were not in privity, the manufacturer would
still be liable on the warranty claim since it "played a significant role in the
sale of the furnace ... [and) actively solicited and dominated the negotiations."
Id. The court held that the manufacturer was estopped from denying that it
was in privity with the buyer. [d. at 649-50 (citing Addressograph-Multigraph
Corp. v. Zink, 273 Md. 277, 329 A.2d 28 (1974».
202. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-313 et seq. (1992).
203. See Sheeskin v. Giant Food, Inc., 20 Md. App. 611, 318 A.2d 874 (1974),
afl'd, 273 Md. 592, 332 A.2d 1 (1975).
204. Fellows v. USV Pharmaceutical Corp., 502 F. Supp. 297,299 (D. Md. 1980);
Certain-Teed Prods. Corp. v. Goslee Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc., 26 Md.
App. 452, 463, 339 A.2d 302, 309 (1975); Sheeskin v. Giant Food, Inc., 20
Md. App. 611,621, 318 A.2d 874, 880 (1974), aff'd, 273 Md. 592, 332 A.2d
I (1975). In the context of construction defects see Starfish Condominium
Ass'n v. York ridge Service Corp., 295 Md. 693, 710,458 A.2d 805, 814 (1983).
205. Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 300, 336 A.2d 118, 126 (1975),
rev'd on other grounds, 278 Md. 304, 363 A.2d 460 (1976). As the comment
to § 2·314 of the Commercial Law Article notes, "an affirmative showing by
the seller that the loss resulted from some action or event following his own
delivery of the goods can operate as a defense." MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW
I § 2-314 cmt. 13 (1992). Also, a showing by the seller that it exercised care
in its manufacture, processing or selection of the product is relevant to whether
or not the warranty was in fact breached. Id.
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On the other hand, there are also clear advantages to bringing
a claim for economic loss under a tort theory. For example, warranty
liability can be waived through the use of a disclaimer .206 Although
the General Assembly has extinguished the right of sellers to disclaim
or limit warranties in the sale of consumer goods/07 there is no
similar limitation with respeCt to non-consumer goods. In addition,
the notice requirements of the uec may also prove to be an obstacle
to recovery. 208 Also, the applicable statute of limitations for a breach
of warranty may, through the use of boilerplate language, be reduced
to as short as one year. 209
IV. RECOVERY OF ECONOMIC LOSS IN CASES
INVOL VING NEGLIGENT DESIGN OR CONSTRUCTION
The tort liability of building contractors to third parties has
generally followed the same path of development as that of manufacturers of chattels,2IO although, as Dean Prosser has observed,
"[t]his was a field in which the ghost of Winterbottom v. Wright
died very hard. "211 The privity defense was the major obstacle to
imposing a tort duty on building contractors for negligent design or
construction. 212 Several other mechanisms also initially shielded contractors from tort liability to third parties. These included the common-law doctrines of caveat emptor 13 and "merger by deed,"214 and
206. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-316 (1992).
207. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-316.1 (1992).
208. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I §§ 2-602, 2-607 (1992). While the court of
appeals has held that a third party beneficiary of a seller's warranties is not
required to give notice of a breach, the actual purchaser of the product must
still do so as a prerequisite to recovery. See generally Frericks v. General
Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 305-06, 336 A.2d 118, 128 (1975).
209. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW 1 § 2-725(1) (1992).
210. F. HARPER ET AL., supra note 8, § 18.5, at 705-11.
211. KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 104A, at 722 (citing 152 Eng. Rep. 402
(1842».
212. See generally Barrett, supra note 12, at 903-05.
213. Id. The doctrine of caveat emptor, or "buyer beware," barred a purchaser of
a new home from suing the seller for defects in the home, irrespective of what
type of damages were incurred-personal injury, property damage, or merely
economic loss. See Leider, supra note 3, at 947; see also Roberts, The Case
oj the Unwary Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did It, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 835,
836-37 (1967).
214. The "merger by deed" doctrine provided that the builder's obligations under
its contract were "merged" into the deed at closing and were thereby satisfied.
See Barrett, supra note 12, at 904; see also MiIIison v. Fruchtman, 214 Md.
515, 518, 136 A.2d 240, 242 (1957) (holding that under Maryland law the
acceptance of a deed gives rise to prima facie presumption that it is an
execution of the entire contract of sale and that the rights of the parties are
to be determined by the deed); Gilbert Constr. Co. v. Gross, 212 Md. 402,
129 A.2d 518 (1957).
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the "completed and accepted" defense.215

A.

The Liability oj Building Contractors to Third Parties

As in the case of defective chattels, the traditional rule was that
a contractor owed no tort duty to the general public, including the
purchaser of the home. 216 The contractor owed a duty only to the
developer or general contractor with whom it had privity. 217 In
determining whether a tort duty might extend to third parties, an
early line of Maryland cases drew a distinction between two types of
negligent conduct: (1) non-performance of a contractual duty, or
"nonfeasance", and (2) improper performance of a contractual duty,
or "misfeasance. "218 Where a contractor simply did nothing to perform a contractual duty-non feasance-it was held that the contractor could be held liable only to the party to whom contractual duties
were owed. 219 On the other hand, where a contractor performed a
contractual duty but did so improperly-misfeasance-it was held
that the contractor could be held liable to third parties as well. 220
One of the most frequently cited of these early cases is Marlboro
Shirt Co. v. American District Telegraph Co. ,221 The plaintiff in
Marlboro Shirt was a tenant in a building whose owner was under
contract with the defendant, a telegraph company, to install an,
"automatic central station signaling device" in the building's sprinkler system. 222 In the event of a water leakage in the sprinkler system,
the device was intended to send a signal to the office of the defendant,
who would then notify the proper authorities. 223 The sprinkler system
soon developed a leak which was not detected by the defendant's
device and not reported to the telegraph company's office, resulting
215. Under the "completed and accepted" defense, once construction was completed
and the work was accepted by the owner, the builder could not be held liable
to anyone except the owner. See generally Annotation, Negligence of Building
or Construction Contractor as Condition of Liability upon His Part for Injury
or Damage to Third Party Occurring After Completion and Acceptance of
Work, 58 A.L.R.20 865 (1958).
216. See Huset v. 1.1. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865, 867-68 (8th Cir.
1903).
217. See id. at 867.
218. Marlboro Shirt Co., Inc. v. American Dis!. Tel. Co., 196 Md. 565, 77 A.2d
776 (1950); East Coast Freight Lines, Inc. v. Consolidated Gas, Electric Light
& Power Co., 187 Md. 385, 50 A.2d 246 (1946); Consolidated Gas, Electric
Light & Power Co. v. Connor, 114 Md. 140,78 A. 725 (1910).
219. East Coast Freight Lines, 187 Md. at 402-03, 50 A.2d at 254.
220. Consolidated Gas Co., 114 Md. at 156-57,78 A. at 729; see KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 14, § 93, at 670-71.
221. 196 Md. 565, 77 A.2d 776 (1951).
222. Id. at 568, 77 A.2d at 776-77.
223. [d.
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in damage to the plaintiff's personal property. 224 In its negligence
action against the telegraph company, the plaintiff did not allege
that the company caused the leak, but rather that it failed to detect
and report the leak.225 The case was therefore one of nonfeasance
rather than misfeasance. The court of appeals upheld the telegraph
company's demurrer, holding that "a contractor owes no duty to
the general public for which it may be responsible in an action in
tort for negligence, if it does not perform its contract. The duty
under such contract is only to the one with which the contract is
made. "226
One year after the Marlboro Shirt decision, the court of appeals
abandoned the misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction in the case of
Otis Elevator Co. v. Embert. 227 In Otis Elevator, the plaintiff brought
a negligence action against an elevator maintenance contractor who
was under contract with the building owner to maintain the elevator. 228 The plaintiff was not injured by any mechanical defect in the
elevator or any failure on the part of the defendant to keep the
elevator in repair. 229 Rather, the plaintiff alleged that the elevator
company was negligent because when the plaintiff entered the elevator, it was not level thereby causing the plaintiff to fall twelve and
one-half inches.230 In defending the claim, the contractor argued that
it owed no duty to the plaintiff to perform its contract with the
building company. 231
224. [d.
225. [d. at 568-69, 77 A.2d at 777.
226. [d. at 571-77, 77 A.2d at 778 (emphasis added); accord East Coast Freight
Lines v. Con'solidated Gas, Electric Light & Power Co., 187 Md. 385, 50 A.2d
246 (1946) (holding that defendant gas company's failure to perform necessary
repairs and replacements to public lighting system pursuant to contract with
Baltimore City was nonfeasance, and that plaintiffs, who were not parties to
the contract, could not recover against gas company in negligence).
This quotation from Marlboro Shirt is often misunderstood and interpreted
overbroadly to mean that a contractor can never be held liable in negligence
to a third party when that negligence arises out of a contractual obligation.
See Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium, Inc. v. Whiting-Turner
Contracting Co., 308 Md. 18, 29-31, 517 A.2d 336, 342-43 (1986). In fact, the
trial judge in Atlantis, in upholding the demurrers of the defendants, stated
that he was bound by this statement in Mar/boro Shirt and concluded that
Maryland law would not recognize a tort duty in the absence of privity under
the circumstances. [d. at 24, 517 A.2d at 339. The court of appeals in Atlantis
disagreed and refused to reaffirm the rather stringent holding of Marlboro
Shirt, finding that Marlboro's general statement "was broader than required
for the determination of that case." [d. at 30, 517 A.2d at 342.
227. 198 Md. 585, 84 A.2d 876 (1951).
228. [d. at 587, 84 A.2d at 876-77. Otis-Elevator was impleaded as a third-party
defendant by the building owner who was sued by a passenger. [d.
229. [d. at 595, 84 A.2d at 880.
230. [d. at 593, 84 A.2d at 879.
231. [d. at 597, 84 A.2d at 881.
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The court first noted that the distinction between misfeasance
and nonfeasance "denotes a difference between absence and existence
of tort liability, but does not appreciably aid in determining whether
or not such liability exists. "232 The court stated further that
[t]he absence of tort liability for breach of contract is not
qualified by the distinction between non-feasance and misfeasance. In such cases such a distinction is not between
non-performance and 'misperformance' of a contract, but
only between conduct, in breach of a contract; which constitutes only a breach of a contract and conduct which also
constitutes a breach of duty, arising out of the nature of
the work undertaken and the conduct, to third persons. 233
Because the elevator company had not breached its contract with
the building owner, the court looked to the scope of the elevator
company's undertaking apart from its contract with the owner.234.
The court cited with apparent approval MacPherson v. Buick Motor
CO.235 for the proposition that "the duty to safeguard life and limb"
does not grow out of contract and nothing else, but rather "its
source [is] in the law. "236 In determining whether the elevator company owed a tort duty independent of the contract, the court held
that because the defendant had undertaken responsibility only for
the maintenance and not the operation of the elevator, the defendant
did not owe a tort duty to the plaintiff. 237
The Otis Elevator decision marked a turning point in Maryland
law. The approach taken by the courts thereafter began to focus not
on the "archaic distinction" 238 between non-feasance and misfeasance, but rather on the determination of whether a duty was imposed
on a defendant to third parties independent of any obligations arising
out of its contract. 239 A tort duty owed to third parties, independent
232. [d. at 598, 84 A.2d at 882.
233. [d. at 597-98, 84 A.2d at 881.
234. [d. at 600-01, 84 A.2d at 883. The court stated that MacPherson "has never
been expressly approved or disapproved by this court, but has been quoted
and distinguished .... For present purposes we shall assume that MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Company and the cases which anticipated or followed it are
law in Maryland." [d. at 599, 84 A.2d at 882.
235. III N.E. 1050 (N. Y. 1916).
236. Otis Elevator, 198 I\:1d. at 598, 84 A.2d at 882 (citing MacPherson, III N.E.
at 1053).
237. [d. at 601, 84 A.2d at 883.
238. Matyas v. Suburban Trust Co., 257 Md. 339, 343, 263 A.2d 16, 18 (1970).
239. See, e.g., id. at 344, 263 A.2d at 19 (holding that "absent a duty exterior to
the contract ... the mere failure to perform does not provide a foundation
for an actionable tort"); Heckrotte v. Riddle, 224 Md. 591, 595, 168 A.2d
879, 882 (1961) (holding that "[t]he mere negligent breach of a contract, absent
a duty or obligation imposed by law independent of that arising out of the
contract itself, is not enough to sustain an action sounding in tort").
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of contractual obligations, may have its source in "contract, conduct
or law."240 For example, in Matyas v. Suburban Trust Co. ,241 the
court of appeals found that a shopping center tenant whose lease
agreement with the landlord required it to maintain the sidewalk free
of ice and snow, did not owe a tort duty "in law" to members of
the general public who might slip and fall on the sidewalk. 242 The
court noted that no ordinance required property owners to keep
public sidewalks abutting their property free of ice and snow. 243
Absent a duty imposed by law and "exterior to the contract" to
keep the sidewalks clean, the lessor's failure to do so was not
actionable in tort. 244
In Cutlip v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 245 the court of special appeals
indicated that a contractor may owe a tort duty to third parties when
it assumes a supervisory role in performing its contract. In Cutlip,
the plaintiffs' decedent, an iron worker, was killed when a portion
of the building he was working on collapsed. 246 The plaintiffs sued
the architect, who was under contract with the owner of the property,
for negligence on the novel theory that an architect's liability may
extend to third parties when he has assumed additional supervisory
responsibilities arising from his contract with the owner. 247 The
architect's additional supervisory responsibilities in Cutlip arose from
his agreement to provide Prince George's County with a field inspection report for the property, in order to procure the building
permit required by the architect's contract with the owner. 248 The
court in Cutlip did not, decide whether the liability of an architect
extends in all cases to the public,249 but did find that in circumstances
where an architect retains supervision of construction and takes on
additional supervisory responsibilities, he owes a duty to the general
public, including the builder's employees, to ensure safe construction.250 The court was not entirely clear whether this duty arose out
of the contract or by operation of law. The court stated, however,
that the architect's "contract with the county to assume additional

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Kreiger v. J.E. Greiner Co., Inc., 282 Md. 50, 57, 382 A.2d 1069, 1073 (1978).
257 Md. 339, 263 A.2d 16 (1970).
Id. at 344, 263 A.2d at 19.
Id. at 341, 263 A.2d at 17.
Id. at 344, 263 A.2d at 19.
22 Md. App. 673, 325 A.2d 432 (1974).
Id. at 676, 325 A.2d at 434.
Id. at 686-87, 325 A.2d at 440.
Id.
Id. at 694-96, 325 A.2d at 444. The court noted that other jurisdictions have
recognized this general tort duty on the part of architects. [d. at 693, 325 A.2d
at 443 (citing Erhart v. Hummonds, 334 S. W .2d 869 (Ark. 1960».
250. Id. at 693-95, 325 A.2d at 443-44.
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supervisory responsibilities clearly subjected him to a duty which
encompassed the decedent. "251
In Kreiger v. J.E. Greiner CO.,252 decided shortly after Cutlip,
the court of appeals addressed the liability of supervisory engineers.
The plaintiff in Kreiger was injured while working on the construction
of a bridge. 253 He sued the project's engineers, who were under
contract with the State Roads Commission to design the bridge and
provide overall supervision of its construction. 254 The court noted
that "[i]t is elementary that for there to be liability on the part of
these engineers such liability would have to arise by virtue of a duty
under contract, conduct, or law. "255 The court, however, did not
confront the question of whether a duty on the part of the engineers
arose by operation of law. Instead, it focused upon the language of
the engineers' contracts with the state, and found that these contracts
did not place upon the engineers a duty to supervise safety in
connection with the construction and did not hold them responsible
for life and property generally.256 The duty of the engineers under
the contracts was simply "to assure a certain end result, a completed
bridge which complie[d] with the plans and specifications. "257
The plaintiffs also alleged that the engineers had assumed other
responsibilities, aside from the contract, for the safety of the workers,
including the obligation to stop the work when it '''was being
performed in a negligent and dangerous manner which was unsafe
for the workmen." '258 The court did not address this argument
because it found that the engineers' contracts with the state negated
the allegation that they were required to supervise the work for
safety.259
Another potential source of duty for contractors, independent
of any contract, is the building code. In Gardenvil/age Realty Corp.
v. Russo,2fIJ a tenant and her mother sued the owner of their residence,

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

260.

[d. at 694, 325 A.2d at 444.
282 Md. 50, 382 A.2d 1069 (1978).
[d. at 52, 382 A.2d 1070.
[d.
[d. at 56-57, 382 A.2d at 1073 (emphasis added). How elementary this prop-

osition was at the time this case was decided is questionable. Notably, the
court cited no cases in support of this statement.
[d. at 68-69, 382 A.2d at 1079.
[d. at 69, 382 A.2d at 1079.
[d. at 69-70, 382 A.2d at 1079.
[d. at 70, 382 A.2d at 1080. The concurring opinion argued that the complaint
alleged facts sufficient to establish a cause of action against the engineers on
the theory that they voluntarily assumed and then breached a duty of care
owed to the plaintiff, independent of any contractual obligations undertaken
in their contract with the state. [d. at 70-71, 382 A.2d at 1080.
34 Md. App. 25, 366 A.2d 101 (1976).
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the general contractor, and others for personal Injuries when a
concrete slab porch collapsed at their residence. 261 The evidence
revealed that the concrete slab was latently defective and not constructed in accordance with the Baltimore City Building Code. 262 The
court found that the building code imposed a "non-delegable, affirmative duty" upon the owner to insure compliance with the code. 263
In 1986, the court of appeals took a decidedly different approach
to the determination of whether a contractor owes a tort duty to
third parties. In Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium, Inc.
v. Whiting- Turner Contracting CO.,264 the court reviewed decisions
in both Maryland and other jurisdictions,265 and determined for the
first time that "privity is not an absolute prerequisite to the existence
of a tort duty."266 Rather, the court found that the issue of whether
a contractor's tort duty extends to third parties should be resolved
by the traditional negligence standard of foreseeability. 267
Perhaps the death knell to the privity defense was struck in St.
James Construction Co. v. Morlock. 268 The court of special appeals
in St. James held that corporate officers and employees of a building
contractor can be held personally liable for economic loss, despite
the lack of privity with the homeowner .269 The court refused to
recognize "'subordinate tiers of privity between corporate "builders"
and their officers and employees." '270 Rather, the court found that
the general rule holding corporate agents personally liable for their
active participation in corporate torts should apply in actions brought
under A tlan tis. 271 The court reasoned that the Atlantis decision sought
to allocate risks to those best able to avoid such risks by "substituting
foreseeability for contractual privity as the principal determinant of
duty."272

261. [d. at 26-27, 366 A.2d at 103.
262. [d. at 28, 366 A.2d at 104.
263. [d. at 39, 336 A.2d at 110. The violation of a building code does not, however,
constitute negligence per se. Pahanish v. Western Trails, Inc., 69 Md. App.
342,362,517 A.2d 1122, 1132 (1986). It may be considered evidence of
negligence if three conditions are met: (1) the plaintiff is a member of the
class of persons the code was designed to protect, (2) the injury suffered is of
the type the statute was designed to prevent, and (3) the plaintiff demonstrates
that the code violation was the proximate cause of the injury sustained. [d.
264. 308 Md. 18, 517 A.2d 336 (1986).
265. [d. at 27-32, 517 A.2d at 341-43.
266. [d. at 32, 517 A.2d at 343.
267. [d. at 32, 517 A.2d at 343-44.
268. 89 Md. App. 217, 597 A.2d 1042 (1991).
269. [d. at 223-24, 597 A.2d at 1045.
270. [d.
271. [d. at 223, 597 A.2d at 1045.
272. [d. at 224, 597 A.2d at 1045.
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B. Atlantis and the Liability oj Building Contractors Under
Maryland Law Jor Economic Loss
In the area of construction defects, courts throughout the country
have been more willing to extend tort liability to damages for purely
economic harm than in the context of product defects. A significant
number of states now permit recovery of purely economic losses in
negligence actions against architects, developers, designers, and other
building contractors. 273 Maryland courts have been slow to address
the economic loss doctrine in the construction area. Not until 1986,
in the seminal case of Council oj Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium
v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co.,m did the Court of Appeals of
Maryland directly confront the issue. In Atlantis, a condominium
association brought a negligence action against the developer, the
general contractor, and the architects of the Atlantis Condominium
in Ocean City, alleging that the utility shafts and related electrical
work at the condominium were constructed in violation of the
building code and the project's plans and specifications. 275 No personal injury or damage to property other than the condominium had
occurred, but the defendants' negligence had created a risk of personal injury to the condominium's unit owners.276 The defendants
argued that, in the absence of privity of contract, they owed no tort
duty to the unit owners.277 Alternatively, they argued that they did
not owe a duty because the unit owners had suffered only economic
loss, not personal injury or property damage.278
The court of appeals rejected both of these arguments:
In following the modern trend, we hold that privity is not
an absolute prerequisite to the existence of a tort duty. The
duty of the architects and the builders in this case, to use
due care in the design,· inspection and construction of this
condominium extended to those persons Joreseeably subject
to the risk oj personal injury created, as here, by a latent

273. For the leading cases permitting recovery of economic loss in negligence against
contractors, see J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979); Barnes v.
Mac Brown & Co., Inc., 342 N.E.2d 619 (Ind. 1976); Oates v. Jag, Inc., 333
S.E.2d 222 (N.C. 1985); Quail Hollow East Condominium Ass'n v. Donald J.
Scholz Co., 268 S.E.2d 12 (N .C. Ct. App. 1980); Juliano v. Gaston, 455 A.2d
523 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982); Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber Mfg.
Co., 384 S.E.2d 730 (S.c. 1989); Terlinde v. Neely, 271 S.E.2d 768 (S.C.
1980); A.E. Inv. Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 214 N.W.2d 764 (Wis. 1974).
274. 308 Md. 18, 517 A.2d 336 (1986).
275. [d. at 21-22, 517 A.2d at 338-39.
276. [d. at 22, 517 A.2d at 338.
277. [d. at 23, 517 A.2d at 339.
278. [d. at 23-24, 517 A.2d at 339.
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and unreasonably dangerous condition resulting from their
negligence. 279
The court concluded that the determination of whether a tort duty
should be imposed should depend upon "the risk generated by the
negligent conduct, rather than upon the fortuitous circumstance of
the nature of the resultant damage. "280 Personal injury or property
damage, the court stated, is not a prerequisite to finding such a
duty.281 Where there is merely a risk of death or personal injury,
regardless of whether privity exists, a plaintiff may recover the
"reasonable cost of correcting the dangerous condition. "282 The court
reasoned that a risk of injury will suffice because a home buyer
should not have to wait for a personal tragedy to occur in order to
recover damages to remedy or repair existing defects.283
Thus, the court of appeals in Atlantis held for the first time
that economic losses-in this case, the costs of remedying code
violations and other dangerous conditions in the condominium's
construction-were recoverable in a negligence action against parties
with whom the plaintiffs enjoyed no privity.284 This was the first
decision in Maryland to make such a holding, either in the context
of construction or product defects.
The court of appeals expressly limited its holding in Atlantis to
instances where the plaintiff is seeking recovery solely for economic
damages where a risk of personal injury is also present. The court
has not addressed the question of whether risk of property damage
would support a tort duty.285 In Jacques v. First National Bank of
[d. at 32, 517 A.2d at 343-44 (emphasis added).
[d. at 35, 517 A.2d at 345.
[d.
[d.
[d. The court of appeals, however, stated that in the absence of actual injury
the nature of the risk must be serious. [d. at 35 n.5, 517 A.2d at 345 n.5.
Conditions which present a risk to general health, welfare, or comfort but fall
short of presenting a clear danger of death or personal injury will not suffice.
[d. Thus, what constitutes .. a clear danger of death or personal injury" will
vary from case to case.
284. Although the court did not expressly state that economic losses were recoverable
in such instances, this is clearly the court's holding. [d. at 21, 517 A.2d at
338; see Boatel Indus., Inc. v. Hester, 77 Md. App. 284, 307-08, 550 A.2d
389, 401 (1988) (characterizing "risk of death or personal injury" incurred as
a result of design and structural defects to plaintiffs' boat as economic loss).
285. In contrast to the Atlantis and Drexel decisions, courts in other states have
not made a distinction on the basis of the nature of the risk generated by a
contractor's conduct. For instance, in Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Manufacturing Co., 384 S.E.2d 730 (S.C. 1989), the Supreme Court of South
Carolina found a legal duty on the part of a builder to refrain from constructing
a house that he knows or should know will pose serious risks of physical harm,
either to persons or property. [d. at 737. This duty, according to the court,

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
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Maryland,286 however, the court set forth, in general terms, when a
tort duty for economic loss will be recognized. Although Jacques
does not involve the liability of a building contractor for economic
loss, it clarifies the court's holding in Atlantis and is thus important
to this discussion.
The plaintiffs in Jacques, Mr. and Mrs. Jacques, had entered
into a residential sales contract with a third party that was contingent
upon their ability to obtain a conventional loan for the balance of
the contract price. 287 They submitted an application for a loan to the
defendant, First National Bank. 288 An officer of the bank subsequently notified the plaintiffs that the loan they qualified for would
not cover the balance of the contract price. 289 When the Jacques
requested that the bank deny their application outright, the bank
refused. 290 The Jacques proceeded to settlement with the bank's loan
after acquiring the balance of the money through personal loans
from relatives and a short-term personal loan of $50,000 from the
bank.291
The Jacques sued the bank for malicious interference with contract, gross negligence, and negligence. 292 The court of appeals determined that a contract existed between the bank and the Jacques
by virtue of statements made by the bank's officer and that this
contract included an implied promise to use reasonable care.293 The
issue for the court was whether a concomitant tort duty existed under
the circumstances. 294
The court first reiterated that the mere negligent breach of a
contract will not alone sustain an action 'sounding in tort. 295 In

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

was imposed by virtue of the applicable building code, construction industry
standards, and public policy. [d. (citations omitted). As the court of appeals
did in At/antis, the Supreme Court of South Carolina reasoned that a plaintiff
need not wait for physical harm to occur before he or she can recover in
negligence. [d. A builder, the court stated, "is no less blameworthy in such a
case where lady luck has smiled upon him and no physical harm has yet
occurred." [d. The court concluded that a builder may be liable in tort despite
the fact that only economic harm was incurred where the builder has (I)
violated a building code, (2) deviated from industry standards, or (3) constructed
a house that he knows or should know will pose a serious risk of physical
harm. [d. at 738.
307 Md. 527, 515 A.2d 756 (1986).
[d. at 528-29, 515 A.2d at 756-57.
[d. at 529, 515 A.2d at 757.
[d. at 530, 515 A.2d at 757.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 530-31, 515 A.2d at 757-58.
[d. at 540, 515 A.2d at 762.
[d.
[d. at 534, 515 A.2d at 759 (quoting Heckrotte v. Riddle, 224 Md. 591, 595,
168 A.2d 879, 882 (1961».
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determining whether a tort duty should be recognized, the court held
that there are two major considerations: "[T]he nature of the harm
likely to result from a failure to exercise due care, and the relationship
that exists between the parties. "296 Applying these two factors, the
court found that because the nature of the harm involved here was
merely economic loss, an "intimate nexus" was required between the
parties as a condition to imposing tort liability. 297 This intimate nexus,
the court stated, could be satisfied only by contractual privity or its
equivalent. 298
Thus, the court of appeals recognized a sliding scale approach
to determining the existence of a tort duty:
We discern from our review of the development of the law
of tort duty that an inverse correlation exists between the
nature of the risk on one hand, and the relationship of the
parties on the other. As the magnitude of the risk increases,
the requirement of privity is relaxed-thus justifying the
imposition of a duty in favor of a large class of persons
where the risk is of death or personal injury. Conversely,
as the magnitude of the risk decreases, a closer relationship
between the parties must be shown to support a tort duty.
Therefore, if the risk created by negligent conduct is no
greater than one of economic loss, generally no tort duty
will be found absent a showing of privity or its equivalent. 299
The court held that this intimate nexus requirement had been
satisfied. 3°O The court reasoned that, in light of the extraordinary
financing provisions of the sales contract, the bank had undertaken
a significant responsibility when it agreed to process the Jacques'
application and determine the amount for which they qualified. 301
The court also considered the nature of the banking industry as a
"public calling," and noted that "[t]he law generally recognizes a
tort duty of due care arising from contractual dealings with professionals such as physicians, attorneys, architects, and public accountants. "302 The court concluded that a cause of action in negligence
exists when a bank "fail[s] to exercise that degree of care which a
296. [d.
297. [d.
298. [d. at 534-35, 515 A.2d at 759-60. The court further stated that where the risk
created is one of personal injury, it is unnecessary to establish a direct
relationship, and foreseeability becomes the principle determinant of a tort
duty. [d. at 535, 515 A.2d at 760.
299. [d. at 537, 515 A.2d at 761.
300. [d. at 540, 515 A.2d at 762.
301. [d. at 540, 515 A.2d at 762-63.
302. [d. at 541, 515 A.2d at 763.
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reasonably prudent bank would have exercised under the same or
similar circumstances.' '303
Thus, the Jacques decision clarifies the court's holding in Atlantis
by more fully describing when a tort duty to avoid economic loss
will be recognized under Maryland law, particularly when the resulting harm is other than a risk of personal injury. The determinative
factors will be (1) the nature of the harm likely to result from the
negligent conduct, without the necessity of actual harm occurring,
and (2) the relationship that exists between the parties. 304
C. Recovery of Economic Loss Against Contractors Under Other
Causes of Action

The court of appeals has also recently discussed the recovery of
economic loss in the context of a negligent misrepresentation action,
indicating that it will broadly apply the "intimate nexus" test. In
Village of Cross Keys, Inc. v. United States Gypsum CO.,305 a
condominium's unit owners sued the developer and architect of the
project for defective design and construction of the condominium's
exterior walls. 306 The developer and architect, in turn, brought a third
party negligent misrepresentation action against United States Gypsum, who they alleged had issued a publication containing the specifications for the curtain wall system used in constructing the
condominium. 307 The third-party claim contended that United States
Gypsum's design in the publication was defective and contained
misrepresentations which were relied upon by the architect when
designing the condominium's walls. 308
In determining whether United States Gypsum owed a tort duty
to the developer and architect, the court cited the factors established
in Atlantis and Jacques-the relationship between the parties and the
nature of the actual or foreseeable harm.309 The court noted that

303. [d. at 544, 515 A.2d at 764.
304. [d. at.534, 515 A.2d at 759. This is provided that the risk involved is of death
or personal injury rather than to the general health, welfare or comfort of the
plaintiff. Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium, Inc. v. Whiting-Turner
Contracting Co., 308 Md. 18, 35 n.5, 517 A.2d 336, 345 n.5 (1986).
305. 315 Md. 741, 556 A.2d 1126 (1989).
306. [d. at 745-46, 556 A.2d at 1127-28.
307. [d. at 747-49, 556 A.2d at 1128-30. The court did not discuss the liability of
the developer and architect to the unit owners. Apparently, the developer
settled with the unit owners prior to the appeal. [d. at 744 n.2, 556 A.2d at
1127 n.2.
308. [d. at 747-49, 556 A.2d at 1128-30.
309. [d. at 751-53, 556 A.2d at 1131-32. The court also cited the following factors
set forth in Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 627, 510 A.2d
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although Atlantis involved negligent conduct, "similar principles
apply when negligent misrepresentation is involved. "310 The court
assumed that the third-party plaintiffs were seeking recovery for
economic loss and. considered the evidence of an "intimate nexus"
or of "a limitation of the group of those who might be harmed
sufficient to avoid the 'specter of unlimited liability, with claims
devastating in number and amount crushing the defendant because
of momentary lapse from proper care."'311 In doing so, the court
interpreted the "intimate nexus" requirement very broadly, and
found that although United States Gypsum had not sold the design
specifications directly to the third-party plaintiffs, there was evidence
that it had the "specific intent" that architects and developers in
general would adopt those specifications. 312 The court concluded that
"it is safe to say [that the defendant] did not develop and publish
these detailed drawings, specifications, and technical data tables for
some altruistic motive.' '313
The federal district court of Maryland did not consider the
existence of an intimate nexus when deciding Flow Industries, Inc.
v. Fields Construction CO. 314 In Flow, a general contractor, Hanks
Contracting, sued the manufacturer and distributor of pump motors
for allegedly making negligent misrepresentations regarding the delivery date for the pumps.315 The pumps were not delivered until nearly
ten months after the date specified in the purchase order, despite
repeated assurances by the distributor that they would soon be
delivered. 316 As a result, Hanks Contracting suffered economic 10sses.317
Hanks had privity with neither the manufacturer nor the distributor,

310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

1078, 1083 (1986):
[T)he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty
that the plaintiff suffered the injury, the closeness of the connection
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral
blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing
future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with
resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost and prevalence
of insurance for the risk involved.
Village of Cross Keys, 315 Md. at 752, 556 A.2d at 1131 (quoting Tarasoff v.
Regents of U niv. of Cal., 551 P .2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976».
[d. at 754, 556 A.2d at 1132.
[d. at 757-58, 556 A.2d at 1133-34 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., THE
LAW OF TORTS § 107 (4th ed. 1971».
[d. at 758, 556 A.2d at 1134.
[d.
683 F. Supp. 527 (D. Md. 1988).
[d. at 529.
[d.
[d. The court's opinion does not identify the nature of the economic losses.
Presumably, the general contractor incurred lost profits as a result of the delay.
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since the pumps were ordered from the distributor by one of Hanks'
subcontractors. 318 Applying Jacques, the district court found that
there was no "special relationship" between the parties that would
constitu'te privity or its equivalent. 319 Indeed, "the parties had deliberately structured their relationships, against the background of wellestablished construction law and practice, to insulate themselves from
one another. "320 The court concluded that "[to] disregard these
relationships and to find the substantial equivalence of privity where
the parties themselves had intentionally avoided it would be contrary
to reason. "321
V.

CONCLUSION

Under the majority approach, the economic loss doctrine holds
malll,lfacturers and building contractors liable to third parties only
when some identifiable physical harm has been incurred to either
persons or to property other than the product or building structure
itself.322 When the harm is incurred to only the product or structure,
courts adopting the economic loss doctrine deny recovery in tort. 323
. This approach is certainly justifiable when the resulting harm is
purely pecuniary or qualitative in nature. Contract and warranty law,
r~ther than tort law, provide the appropriate remedy in such instances. The majority approach fails, however, when the resulting
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. Interestingly, with regard to the distributor's negligent misrepresentation
claim against the manufacturer, the court took a different approach. Although
these parties were in privity, and Jacques might suggest that they owed a duty
of care to one another, the court stated that Jacques was not a negligent
misrepresentation case. Id. at 529-30. The court of appeals in Jacques
did not pretend to foretell all of the circumstances under which a tort
duty will be imposed upon parties in a direct relationship with each
other. Thus, it is too facile to posit the equation that Martens
Chevrolet plus Jacques automatically equals a tort duty upon those
in privity to use reasonable care in what they say to one another.
Id. at 530. The court reasoned that to hold that "a contractual relationship
itself provides the duty of care necessary for the maintenance of a negligent
misrepresentation claim would be to turn the principle into a syllogism. The
contract, in effect, would become an 'independent duty imposed by law.'" Id.
The district court concluded that where "the controversy concerns purely
economic losses allegedly caused by statements made during the course of a
contractual relationship between businessmen, it is plainly contract law which
should provide the rules and principles by which the case is to be governed."
Id. In effect, the district court in Flow Industries turned the "intimate nexus"
requirement in Jacques on its head.
322. See supra note 44.
323 .. See supra note 44.
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harm is actual physical damage to the product or structure. Regardless
of whether this type of harm occurs in a "sudden and calamitous"
manner, the policy reasons in favor of the economic loss doctrine
do not support denying liability. Neither contract principles nor
warranty law are designed to allow recovery for physical harm to
the product itself. Rather, tort law imposes on all persons a standard
of reasonable care to avoid causing foreseeable harm to the property
or to the person of another. Any distinction between physical damage
to the product itself and physical damage to other property is
arbitrary. For instance, if a newly purchased boat has plumbing
problems that result in water damage to the boat's carpeting, the
owner should not be denied recovery in tort merely because no
damage has occurred to other property or to the owner himself. Yet,
most courts in the country would characterize the damage to the
carpeting as an economic loss and deny recovery because no damage
.
to other property or persons was incurred.
Maryland law, in contrast, recognizes that foreseeability should.
be the principal factor in the determination of whether a tort duty
extends to third parties.324 The nature of the harm resulting from a
defendant's negligence is irrelevant. 325 Under Atlantis and its progeny,
mere risk of personal injury results from a contractor's or
where
a manufacturer's negligence, the plaintiff, as well as all others
foreseeably subject to this risk, may recover damages, including
economic losses. An action will lie for the reasonable cost of correcting the dangerous condition regardless of whether actual harm
has yet occurred. 326
In sum, the significance of Atlantis and the recent Morris and
A.J. Decoster decisions cannot be overstated. The Maryland courts
have now adopted a consistent approach, applicable in both the
construction and products liability contexts, that restores the application of traditional tort standards and dismisses arbitrary distinctions
based on the nature of the harm resulting from negligent conduct.

a

Michael R. McCann

324. Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium, Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 308 Md. 18,35,517 A.2d 336, 345 (1986).
325. Id.
326. Id.

